Ever since its introduction by the last Labour government, the Conservative party has railed against the Human Rights Act 1998. This has been primarily for two reasons. (David Allen Green, who is twice as clever as I am, puts it at four.) First, the Human Rights Act represents the imposition of foreign values on the United Kingdom. The elision of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice is not (or not always) a mistake: both are used in the press to exacerbate a general Europhobia. This is what motivates the desire for a “British Bill of Rights”, promised in the 2015 Conservative manifesto and then again after the party’s surprise general election victory. With Brexit dominating the constitutional agenda from the next year, human rights reform never materialised. Second, the Human Rights Act frustrates the state’s maintenance of public order by, for example, prohibiting the deportation of foreign criminals. As Home Secretary, Theresa May gave a speech to the Conservative party conference on Tuesday 4 October 2011, in which she described, among the absurd cases that the Human Rights Act had brought about, “The violent drug dealer who cannot be sent home because his daughter – for whom he pays no maintenance – lives here.” There is a third reason for the unpopularity of the Human Rights Act, although this cannot really be associated with the Conservative party and is probably limited to scholarly circles. It is that the Human Rights Act is constitutionally inappropriate. In a Parliamentary sovereignty, judges should not twist the words of elected representatives, but should allow laws to mean what they say, especially those passed before the Human Rights Act. The Human Rights Act also imports the illegitimate jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.

None of these criticisms withstands serious scrutiny. On the first point, the Human Rights Act makes enforceable in domestic courts the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights, which was ratified by the member states of the newly-formed Council of Europe in 1953. Winston Churchill was an early proponent of the Council of Europe and Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, later Lord Chancellor, led the drafting of the Convention. Since then, the UK has had as much influence as any other country on the interpretation of the Convention by nominating judges to sit on the European Court of Human Rights. Critics of the Convention rights cannot convincingly point to any individual articles or lines of authority that are continental or un-British in nature. It is a pretty British project. On the second point, the Convention rights are crafted in such a way as to enable the state to govern properly. The right to respect for one’s private and family life, for example, is qualified so that it can be interfered with if a public good such as public safety justifies interference. In respect of the deportation of foreign criminals, the law changed in 2014, showing that Parliament is capable of pursuing what it considers to be the public good. Today, the case referred to by Theresa May, decided in 2009 and upheld by the Court of Appeal in 2011, would probably be decided differently. On the third point, as liberal lawyers never tire of pointing out, the Human Rights Act was passed by Parliament, and, by applying it, judges are doing nothing more than enforcing the will of Parliament. Squeezing primary legislation into conformity with Convention rights under section 3, or striking down secondary legislation made by a minister under section 6, is exactly what Parliament has decided it would like judges to do. That is Parliamentary sovereignty.

Nevertheless, complaints about the Human Rights Act continue to emerge from the Conservative party. The newly-appointed Lord Chancellor, Dominic Raab, spoke about “overhauling” the Human Rights Act at the party conference in Manchester on 5 October 2021. The 2009 case reappeared, although whether it forms part of a legitimate case against the Human Rights Act since the 2014 amendment is unclear. Raab’s demotion (or promotion, depending on your perspective) provoked fears because he has a track-record of antipathy towards the Human Rights Act. However, the choice of the strong but vague word “overhaul” might suggest that a full repeal is not on the cards.

I will not say that this is a bad thing. Especially in the context of the present government, the loss of an opportunity to vindicate Convention rights in UK courts, by way of judicial review or a claim directly under the Human Rights Act, would have a disastrous human impact. However, on a level of constitutional principle and for the protection of rights in the long term, there is a case for repealing the Human Rights Act.  

Parliamentary sovereignty was the primary constitutional principle to emerge from the tumult of seventeenth-century England. At that time, the emphasis was on Parliamentary sovereignty as opposed to sovereignty of the Crown. However, at least since A. V. Dicey’s 1885 work, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, the English legal establishment has considered that the emphasis is on the sovereignty of Parliament, as opposed to a Parliament with limited power to legislate. Professor Dicey wrote at pp. 3–4 (eighth edition, 1915, reprinted by the Liberty Fund, 1982):

The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither more or less than this, namely, that Parliament thus defined has, under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatsoever; and further, no person or body is recognised by the law as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.

Wade and Forsyth’s Administrative Law (eleventh edition, Oxford University Press 2014) states at p. 21:

The power of an Act of the sovereign Parliament, howsoever enacted, is boundless.

During the UK’s membership of the European Union, the single important exception to this principle was that primary legislation passed by Parliament would be invalid to the extent that it conflicted with EU law.[1] However, since it was Parliament, by the European Communities Act 1972, that authorised this state of affairs, and Parliament could put an end to it if it wished, as it eventually did, Parliament remained in principle sovereign.[2] And now that the UK has left the EU, no higher law exists than primary legislation on the domestic legal plane, according to orthodox constitutional theory.

The UK is unusual in this regard. In few other developed democracies is the legislature able to pass whatever law it wants by a simple majority, unlimited by fundamental rights or other constitutional restrictions on legislation. That is because an elective dictatorship, as Lord Hailsham called the UK system of Parliamentary sovereignty combined with executive dominance of Parliament, is illiberal in that it offers no protection to individuals or groups that fall into disfavour with the majority. Every person’s fundamental rights and freedoms demand protection, from the courts as a matter of justice and from the state as a matter of justification for its existence. Absolute Parliamentary supremacy is not an acceptable constitutional principle.

UK constitutional law is creeping towards acceptance of this reality. This can be seen on two levels.

On a structural level, senior judges have held, usually obiter and hypothetically, that the courts might not enforce a law enacted by Parliament that violated fundamental constitutional values. In Jackson v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56; [2006] 1 AC 262, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead said at [102]:

The classic account given by Dicey of the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament, pure and absolute as it was, can now be seen to be out of place in the modern United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the supremacy of Parliament is still the general principle of our constitution. It is a construct of the common law. The judges created this principle. If that is so, it is not unthinkable that circumstances could arise where the courts may have to qualify a principle established on a different hypothesis of constitutionalism. In exceptional circumstances involving an attempt to abolish judicial review or the ordinary role of the courts, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords or a new Supreme Court may have to consider whether this is a constitutional fundamental which even a sovereign Parliament acting at the behest of a complaisant House of Commons cannot abolish.

And Lord Hope of Craighead said at [104], at the start of a whole speech on this topic:

Our constitution is dominated by the sovereignty of Parliament. But Parliamentary sovereignty is no longer, if it ever was, absolute. It is not uncontrolled in the sense referred to by Lord Birkenhead LC in McCawley v The King [1920] AC 691, 720. It is no longer right to say that its freedom to legislate admits of no qualification whatever. Step by step, gradually but surely, the English principle of the absolute legislative sovereignty of Parliament which Dicey derived from Coke and Blackstone is being qualified.

In Hartian terms, the rule of recognition in English law is up for grabs. Alternatively, in the terms of T. R. S. Allan, who rejects the idea of a positivist rule of recognition, judges are beginning to recognise that a statute that flouted “the essentials of justice and good governance” would not be legitimate, and would therefore not “qualify as law”.[3] Whatever constitutional-theoretical model one prefers, the cases show that it is no longer clear that judges will unfailingly accept primary legislation as valid law.[4] Two weeks ago, Abella J, writing for the minority of four justices in the Supreme Court of Canada, cited Jackson, AXA and Privacy International (see [4]) as well as R (Miller) v Prime Minister [2019] UKSC 41; [2020] AC 373 to support the proposition that “unwritten constitutional principles have full legal force and can serve as substantive limitations on all branches of government” (Toronto (City) v. Ontario (Attorney General) 2021 SCC 34 at [166]).

On the level of rights, the courts have developed the doctrine of common-law constitutional rights, whose enumeration is determined by constitutional values such as the rule of law. As Lord Hope said in Jackson at [107], “The rule of law enforced by the courts is the ultimate controlling factor on which our constitution is based.”[5]

But what role can constitutional rights or the rule of law have under Parliamentary sovereignty? The courts have tried have it both ways. Their main tool in this respect is called the principle of legality. Lord Hoffmann’s explanation of the principle of legality in R (Simms) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] 2 AC 115 has become the standard account. He said at 131:

Parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament can, if it chooses, legislate contrary to fundamental principles of human rights. The Human Rights Act 1998 will not detract from this power. The constraints upon its exercise by Parliament are ultimately political, not legal. But the principle of legality means that Parliament must squarely confront what it is doing and accept the political cost. Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words. This is because there is too great a risk that the full implications of their unqualified meaning may have passed unnoticed in the democratic process. In the absence of express language or necessary implication to the contrary, the courts therefore presume that even the most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual. In this way the courts of the United Kingdom, though acknowledging the sovereignty of Parliament, apply principles of constitutionality little different from those which exist in countries where the power of the legislature is expressly limited by a constitutional document.

The principle of legality allows the courts to uphold and apply constitutional values while not only paying lip-service to, but in substance maintaining, Parliamentary sovereignty.

The result is that the protection of constitutional rights is weak for two reasons. First, the principle of legality is half-hearted in its application because of its subservient relationship with the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty. Second, the courts have been hesitant to recognise a wide range of individual rights as constitutionally guaranteed. The common-law constitution, in both structure and substance, is small and struggling to grow.

Why? Because of the Human Rights Act.

The legal mechanics of the Human Rights Act are similar to what the courts currently accept is their role in protecting constitutional rights. Section 3 of the Human Rights Act mirrors the principle of legality, in that it requires courts to interpret legislation in line with Convention rights wherever possible. Lord Hoffmann drew this parallel in Simms at 132: “the principle of legality will be expressly enacted as a rule of constriction in section 3 [of the Human Rights Act]”. Section 4, which provides for declarations of incompatibility with Convention rights, has no practical effect.[6] The Human Rights Act’s chief virtue over the common law is its explicit enumeration of rights. As is inevitable, there remains debate over the scope of each right, but there are clear starting-points. The Human Rights Act provides effective protection or redress in countless situations, including state surveillance, protest, welfare policy and inquests.

That all sounds wonderful. What’s the problem? The problem is that the Human Rights Act has arrested the development of the common-law constitution. It removes any incentive for the common law to develop, while providing only moderate protection against the abuse of state power. The Human Rights Act is no substitute for fully-developed constitutionalism, but the constitution cannot fully develop while the Human Rights Act remains. To borrow David Allen Green’s image, the Human Rights Act is a set of constitutional stabilisers, and they need to come off.

There are two ways in which common-law constitutional doctrine needs to evolve. The first is structural: What do constitutional principles such as the rule of law and fundamental rights mean in practice, and what is their relationship with Parliamentary sovereignty? The second is elaborative: What are the rights that the constitution guarantees? These are difficult, controversial questions. Litigants will not build their cases on uncertain foundations unless they have no choice. If you were at risk of deportation, and you could ask the court to prevent your deportation on the basis of either the settled law of the Human Rights Act, or some untested constitutional theory, what would choose? The same goes for most judges, who are not attracted to controversy. There is no reason – arguably no way – for the common-law constitution to develop while the Human Rights Act is squatting on top of it.

This matters because the Human Rights Act only achieves a fraction of what the common-law constitution could and should become if given a chance to flourish. The Human Rights Act respects and affirms Parliamentary sovereignty. It purports to fulfil the role of guardian of rights while permitting Parliament to pass laws that expressly and seriously violate fundamental rights. It would not have been passed otherwise: Parliament would not willingly give up its sovereignty. But the protection that fundamental rights require is both from government and from Parliament, as the framers of written constitutions around the world knew. Until it is repealed to enable the constitution to develop rightly, so that the rule of law, and no longer Parliamentary sovereignty, is the master constitutional principle,[7] the Human Rights Act will remain the tapeworm in the belly of the constitution. Dicey called the British constitution “the most flexible polity in existence” (p. 39). Constitutional law must be permitted to flex in the only way the common law knows how to develop, through litigation, so that the normative basis of the constitution can be reflected in doctrine. 

During the previous decade, aware of the Conservative party’s unkind intentions towards the Human Rights Act, the courts have prodded the doctrine of common-law constitutional rights awake. In R (Osborn) v Parole Board [2013] UKSC 61; [2014] AC 1115, Lord Reed said at [57]:

The importance of the [Human Rights] Act is unquestionable. It does not however supersede the protection of human rights under the common law or statute, or create a discrete body of law based on the judgments of the European court. Human rights continue to be protected by our domestic law, interpreted and developed in accordance with the Act when appropriate.

And in Kennedy v Charity Commission [2014] UKSC 20; [2015] AC 455 at [46], Lord Mance said:

Since the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998, there has too often been a tendency to see the law in areas touched on by the Convention solely in terms of the Convention rights. But the Convention rights represent a threshold protection; and, especially in view of the contribution which common lawyers made to the Convention’s inception, they may be expected, at least generally even if not always, to reflect and to find their homologue in the common or domestic statute law.

And at [133] Lord Toulson said:

The analysis set out above is based on common law principles and not on article 10, which in my view adds nothing to the common law in the present context. This is not surprising. What we now term human rights law and public law has developed through our common law over a long period of time. The process has quickened since the end of World War II in response to the growth of bureaucratic powers on the part of the state and the creation of multitudinous administrative agencies affecting many aspects of the citizen’s daily life. The growth of the state has presented the courts with new challenges to which they have responded by a process of gradual adaption and development of the common law to meet current needs. This has always been the way of the common law and it has not ceased on the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, although since then there has sometimes been a baleful and unnecessary tendency to overlook the common law. It needs to be emphasised that it was not the purpose of the Human Rights Act that the common law should become an ossuary.

The subtext is that, if the Human Rights Act is repealed, we will need another means of preventing the abuse by the state of fundamental rights. And we have such a means. But while we in fact do have the protections of the Human Rights Act, the common law will not have the opportunity to fully flesh out constitutional principles. As the essays in Mark Elliott and Kirsty Hughes’ book show, the only rights that have been seriously developed during this period are those related to the institutions of justice, such as the right of access to the courts or the right to have justice done in public.[8] The courts have cleaved to the core of the rule of law and have been hesitant to explore the full range of protections that the constitution guarantees.

Maybe this is all wishful thinking. Maybe it is a risk whose costs are too high. Under the Human Rights Act, we have some kind of guarantee of fundamental rights enforceable in domestic courts, which is better than we have had for most of our history. But the 1970s and 1980s showed us that the courts are capable of using the constitutional means at their disposal, even if they have been neglected, to address the problems of the day the according to what are recognised as the pressing demands of justice. Further, do we want to wait for Parliament to pass a flagrantly oppressive law that the Human Rights Act is powerless to touch before asking the courts for a definitive answer to the question raised in Jackson? It will happen one day. The courts have started to deal with the reality that politicians don’t play by the rules anymore (R (Miller) v Prime Minister). They must take the full implications of that realisation seriously. The common-law constitution needs to evolve beyond Parliamentary sovereignty. It needs to regain its confidence and mature. If one more metaphor will not break the camel’s back, we have been sending villagers to appease the dragon since 1688. Do we have to wait until the princess is chosen as tribute before summoning Saint George? When he comes, he can’t be riding with stabilisers. We have to repeal the Human Rights Act.

What I’ve been doing this week…

I moved to Cambridge! So almost all of my reading has been prescribed. But Cambridge means walking which means podcasts. I’ve returned to Talking Politics: HISTORY OF IDEAS, hypnotically delivered by David Runciman. And I’ve started the wonderful Borderline Jurisprudence with Başak Etkin and Kostia Gorobets, which as an international law amateur I struggle to keep up with sometimes but it’s fascinating and imbued with humanity and a sense of humour. In other news I have continued my struggle to make tofu crispy.

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[1] R (Factortame Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 365 and [1991] 1 AC 603.

[2] R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5; [2018] AC 61 at [60].

[3] T. R. S. Allan, The Sovereignty of Law: Freedom, Constitution, and Common Law (Oxford University Press 2013), p. 167.

[4] See also Lord Hope’s words in AXA General Insurance Ltd v Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46; [2012] HRLR 3 at [50] to [51], and, more recently, Lord Carnwath’s words in R (Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2019] UKSC 22; [2019] HRLR 13 at [144].

[5] For examples of common-law constitutional rights in action, see, R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51; [2017] ICR 1037 at [66] to [85] and R (Bugdaycay) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1987] AC 514 at 531. Mark Elliott and Kirsty Hughes’ volume Common Law Constitutional Rights (Bloomsbury 2020) attests to this developing area of the law.

[6] Notwithstanding Lord Reed’s challenging comment this week in the Scottish UNCRC case [2021] UKSC 42 at [50].

[7] Lord Hope in Jackson at [107].

[8] Mark Elliott and Kirsty Hughes (eds), Common Law Constitutional Rights (Bloomsbury 2020); UNISON; A v BBC [2014] UKSC 25; [2015] AC 588.