When is a duty not a duty? Interpreting the main homeless duty in Elkundi v Birmingham and Imam v Croydon

Housing has been in the news quite a bit over the last few weeks. We have seen the inclusion in the Queen’s Speech of the much-anticipated and long-delayed Social Housing Regulation Bill and Renters’ Reform Bill, aimed at increasing regulatory oversight and improving standards in the social and private rented sectors. The Prime Minister has announced that he is once again considering extending the controversial Right to Buy to England’s two million housing association tenants. Meanwhile, in an interview on Thursday morning, the Levelling Up Secretary, Michael Gove refused  to recommit the Government to its 300,000 annual housebuilding target. But amid all the sound and fury, an important judgment was handed down by the Court of Appeal on 4 May in the joined cases of R (Elkundi) v Birmingham City Council and R (Imam) v London Borough of Croydon [2022] EWCA Civ 601, which could have far-reaching implications for local authorities and homeless households across the country.

The two appeals concerned the interpretation and application of s.193(2) Housing Act 1996, known as the ‘main housing duty’, which states that, where an applicant is unintentionally homeless and in priority need, “unless the authority refer the application to another local housing authority, they shall secure that accommodation is available for occupation by the applicant.” Both appeals raised important questions around the extent of this duty and the circumstances in which a local housing authority might be said to have discharged it. The initial claimants all belonged to households which were trapped in unsuitable accommodation at the time the claims were brought, either through overcrowding or a lack of adaptation to meet the needs of disabled family members or both. 

In the first appeal in Elkundi, the Judge in the lower court, Mrs Justice Steyn, had held that s.193(2) imposed an “immediate, unqualified and non-deferrable duty” on a local authority to secure accommodation for a homeless applicant [2]. The local authority, Birmingham City Council, appealed on the basis that this was a misreading of the statutory provision. It contended that it was only under a duty to secure that accommodation be made available within a reasonable period of time, the reasonableness of the period being dependent on the circumstances.

Steyn J also held that Birmingham City Council’s misunderstanding of the nature of its duty under s.193(2) rendered the operation of its system for housing homeless applicants in unsuitable accommodation unlawful, since it wrongly considered it had a reasonable time in which to secure them suitable accommodation and could therefore comply with its duty by temporarily leaving them in unsuitable accommodation [61]. She issued a mandatory order requiring Birmingham to secure accommodation for one of the five initial claimants, Mr Ahmed, within 12 weeks and indicated that she would have done the same for Mr Elkundi, had he not already been offered suitable accommodation by the time the case was heard [62–63]. The local authority appealed on four further grounds, relating to the lawfulness of its system for housing homeless applicants and the Judge’s reasons for granting relief to specific claimants. These are set out in the judgment of the Court of Appeal at [70] and summarised at [3], and the conclusions of Lewis LJ on the issues they raise are set out at [109–123]. The main issues raised by the further grounds of appeal were whether Birmingham was operating an unlawful system for housing homeless applicants and whether it is possible for an individual to waive their right to suitable accommodation, once that right has been established.

In the second appeal, the Court considered the circumstances in which mandatory relief might be refused by the courts once a duty to house a homeless applicant in suitable accommodation has been established. The initial claimant, Ms Imam, appealed against the refusal by the Deputy Judge in the court below to grant a mandatory order compelling Croydon Borough Council to comply with its statutory duty under s.193(2) in circumstances where it had already accepted it was in breach of it. The sole ground of appeal here was that this refusal constituted an error in principle.  

The extent of the main housing duty

The primary issue upon which the Court had to rule in the first appeal was the extent of the main housing duty. The Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the lower court’s formulation of the duty under s.193(2) as immediate, unqualified and non-deferrable. Speaking at a webinar hosted by Doughty Street Chambers, Zia Nabi, who acted for Mr Elkundi and the other respondents in the first appeal, noted that this judgment effectively reinforces the orthodox interpretation of the statutory provision.[1] Indeed, the Court apparently did not consider this to be an especially complicated or lengthy point. The case advanced by the local authority, that the use of the word “shall” in s.193(2) indicated that “Parliament intended that the authority would make arrangements for the provision of accommodation in the future” [72], would have constituted a radical departure from the existing understanding of the main housing duty had it been accepted. In this context, it is unsurprising that the Court instead preferred to interpret the word “shall” to mean “must” and to refer to an immediate obligation to secure suitable accommodation for eligible applicants, rather than one to be fulfilled in the future [77].

What does this mean for local housing authorities facing major financial challenges or a severe shortage of appropriate housing stock in which to house homeless applicants, especially disabled applicants who require specifically adapted homes to be able to enjoy a good quality of life? Does the immediate and unqualified nature of the main housing duty mean that such factors cannot be taken into consideration by councils or the courts? Well, not exactly. In paragraph 170 of her judgment in the lower court, Steyn J held that:

Interpreting the duty as unqualified does not mean that the circumstances in which the local housing authority is seeking to perform its duty are relegated to be considered only at the relief stage. First, they are taken into account in determining whether a person is homeless under section 175(3) … Second, the flexible concept of suitability imports considerations such as the length of time an applicant has been in a particular type of accommodation and the dearth of availability of the type of accommodation the applicant requires in the longer term.

In his leading judgment in the Court of Appeal, Lewis LJ endorsed this notion of suitability as a flexible concept, which may be influenced by the resources available to the local housing authority and the circumstances of the individual case. Thus, a dearth of alternative accommodation might lead a council to conclude that an applicant’s current accommodation is suitable for continued occupation on a temporary basis, even if it would be unsuitable for them to occupy in the long term. Lewis LJ further clarified that it may sometimes be appropriate and necessary for a local authority to provide an applicant with different accommodation at different times. Permanent accommodation suitable for long-term occupation need not be secured immediately in order to fulfil the duty, though it should be the ultimate goal [81–82]. Where a local housing authority considers that the accommodation currently being occupied is suitable in the short or medium term, but unsuitable in the longer term, they should clearly state this conclusion in their decision letters to homeless applicants [83].

However, once a local authority has accepted that accommodation is unsuitable, it must secure suitable accommodation for the applicant right away. It is not enough to place them on a waiting list for suitable accommodation somewhere down the line. When a decision on unsuitability is reached, a local authority will be in breach of its duty for as long as the applicant remains in their current unsuitable accommodation [83].

The Court declined to rule on whether a local authority can change its mind over whether accommodation is suitable, having initially found it to be unsuitable (dealt with in the judgment as ‘the fourth issue’ [120–123]). Steyn J had expressed the view, obiter, that such a reversal of an initial decision by a local authority would be unlawful. The Court of Appeal judgment noted that Lewis LJ “would not want it to be assumed that the obiter dicta of the Judge are correct” but indicated that this point should be decided in a future case where it actually arises on the facts [121].

Was Birmingham’s system unlawful?

The second issue upon which the Court ruled was the lawfulness or otherwise of Birmingham’s system for housing homeless applicants. Social housing in Birmingham has been at the centre of a number of controversies in recent years, particularly with regard to the level of regulation in the exempt accommodation sector. The council also has an exceptionally long housing waiting list and very few homes available which are suitable for large families or properly adapted for occupation by disabled people. Despite, or perhaps because of, these challenging circumstances, Birmingham lacks a written policy explaining how properties are allocated to homeless persons under Part VII Housing Act 1996 [47]. Neither had it carried out equality impact assessments to demonstrate that it had had regard to the impact of its allocation system on disabled applicants [114]. While neither a written allocation policy nor equality impact assessments are mandatory, both are good practice.

In essence, the system being operated by Birmingham in respect of applicants to whom the main housing duty was owed was to place them on a waiting list known as the ‘Planned Move List’ (PML), along with applicants in “apparent priority need” to whom an interim duty was owed under s.188 Housing Act 1996, and to match them with suitably-sized properties as they became available, according to the length of time they had been on the list [46, 109]. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the lower court that this system was unlawful, in that it failed to distinguish between people living in accommodation which was currently unsuitable and those living in accommodation which was suitable in the short or medium term but would become unsuitable in the long term [113]. Moreover, the council was unable to evidence that it had had due regard to its duty under s.149 Equality Act 2010 to eliminate discrimination, advance equality of opportunity, and foster good relations between those who share the protected characteristic of disability and those who do not. [114]

Can the right to suitable accommodation be waived?

The third issue was whether the right to suitable accommodation can be waived, once a local authority has accepted that it owes a duty to an applicant. This point arose because one of the initial claimants in Elkundi, Mr Al-Shameri, had indicated that he preferred to stay in his current accommodation, where his wife had an assured tenancy, while Birmingham looked for suitable accommodation for him. The question was whether this constituted a waiver of his right to suitable accommodation.

The Court dealt with this point fairly briefly. It held that the right can be waived, but only with informed consent of the applicant, who always has the right to change their mind [117]. Lewis LJ recognised that there may be circumstances where a person prefers to remain in their current accommodation until suitable long-term accommodation can be secured for them, especially if the duty owed is an interim one under s.188, if the alternative accommodation would be very temporary (for example bed and breakfast accommodation), and/or if they would have to give up a secure long-term tenancy in order to move into uncertain interim accommodation [116]. It is therefore vital that local authorities take steps to properly ascertain applicants’ wishes and keep them fully informed of their rights and of the outcome if they refuse the offer of suitable accommodation.

Can relief be withheld where the main housing duty is breached?

The fifth issue and the main substance of the second appeal concerned the proper approach of the court to the grant of a mandatory order to compel a local housing authority to secure suitable accommodation for a homeless applicant, once a breach of duty has been established. Ms Imam appealed against the refusal of the Deputy Judge to grant an order mandating that Croydon Council secure suitable accommodation for her, while Birmingham appealed against the grant of a mandatory order on behalf of Mr Ahmed.

In the case of Ms Imam, the Deputy Judge had held that Croydon were doing all they reasonably could to secure suitable accommodation for her, within the context of the general shortage of accommodation in the area and other applicants’ greater levels of need and longer periods waiting for suitable accommodation [67]. He noted in particular that Croydon’s resources were finite. Its estimated budgetary overspend in the current year was £67 million, and indeed readers can hardly fail to have heard about the borough’s financial crisis, which took it to the brink of bankruptcy and recently resulted in its Labour administration losing overall control of the council and the mayoral race to the Conservative candidate.

On appeal, the Claimant submitted that once a local housing authority has accepted that it has a duty, a failure to discharge it is an affront to rule of law and relief must therefore be granted [125]. Croydon stressed that a mandatory order is a discretionary remedy and submitted that the Deputy Judge was entitled to take into account the factors that he did, when deciding whether to grant relief [127].

At the Doughty Street webinar, Martin Westgate QC, who acted for Ms Imam, suggested that the Deputy Judge had incorrectly imported a purported legal test of “intolerability” from Baroness Hale’s judgment in Ali v Birmingham City Council [2009] UKHL 36, [2009]; 1 W.L.R. 1506, even though such a test does not actually exist. The mandatory order had been refused on the basis that Ms Imam had failed to evidence that the conditions in which she was living were having an extremely serious effect on her, or that they were “intolerable” or that “enough was enough” [67]. This was an incorrect approach for two reasons: first, because “intolerability” is not a legal test, and second, because the burden is on the authority to show why an order should not be made once breach is established, rather than on claimant to show why it should be.

The correct approach, per Lewis LJ, was to consider whether the local housing authority has taken “all reasonable steps” to perform the duty [132-134]. Although the judgment does not frame this in terms of a strict legal test, it is the approach taken by the Court in relation to both the Birmingham and Croydon appeals. Breaches of duty under s.193(2) are on a scale of seriousness, and the more serious and significant the breach, the more detailed evidence the local authority will need to provide to demonstrate that it has taken all reasonable steps to remedy the breach and secure suitable accommodation for the applicant. “References to the general difficulties facing housing authorities, or the lack of availability of suitable properties”, without specific details on the number and type of properties available and why they cannot be used, will most likely be insufficient [132]. In both of the present cases, the Court of Appeal held that the local authorities had failed to adduce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that they had taken all reasonable steps to remedy the breaches. Thus a mandatory order was correctly granted in the case of Mr Ahmed and ought to have been granted in the case of Ms Imam [142, 150].

The Court also held that the Deputy Judge in Imam had erred in taking into account budgetary constraints when considering whether a mandatory order was appropriate once the housing authority had accepted that Ms Imam was homeless and her current accommodation was unsuitable, since the decision on unsuitability had already taken into account budgetary considerations [141]. To consider them again at the relief stage would therefore introduce element of double counting. The courts are entitled to take into account a wide range of factors when deciding whether to exercise their discretion to provide mandatory relief, including but not limited to the extent of the unsuitability, the length of time the claimant has been waiting and the impact on their life, the likelihood of compliance in the near future, the risk of unfairness to other applicants, and any policy on the part of the local authority not to use its Part VI housing stock for Part VII purposes [141–144], but general budgetary constraints do not form part of this list.

In some respects, the points dealt with in these appeals seem self-explanatory. The value of this judgment lies not in moving the law on in any dramatic way but in clarifying the expectations on local authorities. The fact that both Birmingham and Croydon were held not to have taken all reasonable steps to house the claimants in suitable accommodation, despite the manifest financial and administrative challenges faced by both in addressing unmet housing need within their local authority areas, demonstrates that the hurdle for avoiding mandatory relief when s.193(2) is breached is very high. Local authorities will need to consider this carefully when assessing suitability and allocating resources to housing applicants once a duty has been established. Clear communication with applicants and careful record keeping will also help them when it comes to demonstrating compliance with their s.193(2) duty. The Court of Appeal refused Birmingham permission to appeal. They may yet apply to the Supreme Court for permission but given the unanimous, clear-cut and forceful nature of this judgment, they seem rather unlikely to succeed. 

What I’ve been up to recently…

I hope that readers will forgive the radio silence from your Green and Pleasant bloggers during the month of April. I was preparing for my final Bar exams at the end of last month, while Sam was completing his dissertation. With exams now over, I am very much looking forward to a planned cycle touring holiday to the Outer Hebrides at the beginning of June and desperately hoping for clement weather.


[1] Readers can find further details about the webinar here and can request a copy of the transcript by emailing events@doughtystreet.co.uk.

Split decision in Mozambique gas project challenge

Back in October last year, I wrote a piece arguing that the UK legal system is ill-equipped to deal with the climate crisis. Citing a number of high-profile legal challenges to carbon-intensive infrastructure projects which have been dismissed over the last few years, I argued that the wide margin of appreciation enjoyed by decision-makers when it comes to translating the UK’s legally binding emissions-reduction targets into actual policy and the reluctance of judges to be seen to be making politicised decisions meant that such challenges are likely to keep failing. Since then, two interesting judgments have been handed down in cases concerning decisions to approve new fossil fuel developments, which have caused me to revisit some of the assertions I made in my previous post on the subject to see whether they still hold true.

First there was the judgment in R (on the application of Finch) v Surrey County Council [2022] EWCA Civ 187. Here, a majority of the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of Holgate J that Surrey County Council’s approval of a new oil well at Horse Hill was lawful, but disagreed that downstream greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are “legally incapable” of being factored in as an indirect effect of a project for the purposes of its Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). The court held instead that such emissions should be included where there is a sufficiently close connection between the proposed project and its putative effect, with the existence of such a connection being decided on a case-by-case basis [41, 141]. The majority found that the necessary causal connection was absent in the present case [85]. However, Moylan LJ held that there was a close connection and the decision to exclude end-use emissions from the EIA was therefore legally flawed. In his own words, “it is not difficult to describe the combustion of material obtained from a development whose sole purpose is to obtain that material for combustion as being an environmental effect of the development” [138].

Then, on 15 March last week, there was another split decision in the High Court over the legality of the UK government’s approval of $1.15bn of export credit finance for a huge liquified natural gas (LNG) project in Mozambique. So, why could Lord Justice Stuart-Smith, who normally sits in the Court of Appeal, and Mrs Justice Thornton not agree? What happens in the event of a 1–1 split decision of this kind? And what (if anything) might R (Friends of the Earth Ltd) v Secretary of State for International Trade / Export Credits Guarantee Department & Chancellor of the Exchequer [2022] EWHC 568 (Admin) mean for the future of UK climate litigation?

The proposed site for the LNG project is in northern Mozambique, in the offshore Rovuma Basin. It is anticipated that around 5% of the LNG extracted would be retained for domestic use in Mozambique, with the remaining 95% being exported. The challenge to the project, brought by Friends of the Earth (FoE), was really a challenge to three separate decisions.

  1. First, there was the decision on 10 June 2020 by the CEO of UK Export Finance (UKEF) — the government’s export credit agency, which works alongside the Department for International Trade to help UK exporters to find new markets through loans, guarantees and insurance — to provide $1.15bn in financial support for the project, which was supported by the Secretary of State for International Trade.
  1. Second, there was the approval of this investment by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on 12 June 2020.
  1. Third and finally, there was the decision of 30 June 2020 by the Accounting Officer and Chief Executive of UKEF to approve the underwriting minute and the decision of 1 July 2020 of the Chief Executive of UKEF to approve the clearance of documents memorandum.

However, for the sake of ease, I will group these stages together and refer to them jointly as ‘the decision’. The decision was controversial within government at the time, with support from then Secretary of State for International Trade, Liz Truss, but concerns or outright opposition expressed by Business Secretary Alok Sharma, Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab and International Development Secretary Anne-Marie Trevelyan. In particular, ministers opposed to the project cited the reputational risks it posed in the context of the UK’s hosting of COP 26 the following year. Stuart-Smith LJ recognised the controversies surrounding the project in his judgment but was at pains to stress at several points that the role of the courts in cases of judicial review is not to comment on the merits of a decision but only on its legality [6, 49, 95].

FoE challenged the decision on two, closely related grounds.

  1. Ground 1(a): the decision was based on an error of law or fact, namely that the Project and its funding was compatible with the United Kingdom’s commitments under the Paris Climate Change Agreement (“the Paris Agreement”) and/or assisted Mozambique to achieve its commitments under the Paris Agreement; and/or
  1. Ground 1(b): UKEF’s decision was otherwise unlawful in so far as it was reached without regard to essential relevant considerations in reaching the view that funding the Project aligned with the UK and Mozambique’s obligations under the Paris Agreement.

In ruling on each of these grounds, the Court was concerned with three main questions, summarised by Stuart-Smith LJ at [96]:

First, what is the appropriate scope of enquiry when a decision maker decides to take something into account in the course of the decision-making process? Second, should the Court entertain submissions and decide questions of interpretation of the Paris Agreement? Third, and related to the second, is the Foreign Act of State doctrine relevant or applicable to the facts of this case?

The scope of enquiry

All public bodies are under a Tameside duty to carry out a sufficient enquiry prior to making a decision, so that they are in possession of all the necessary information required to make it. The name is derived from Lord Diplock’s judgment in Secretary of State for Education and Science v Metropolitan Borough of Tameside [1976] 3 All ER 665 at 696, [1977] AC 1014, where he held that the question for a court is: “did the Secretary of State ask himself the right question and take reasonable steps to acquaint himself with the relevant information to enable him to answer it correctly?” [1065].

However, subsequent case law has tended to view the question of what considerations should be taken into account and what information should be sought as being a matter for the decision-maker and largely context-specific, subject to the irrationality test and any statutory requirements. Citing the judgment of the High Court in R (Spurrier) v Transport Secretary [2019] EWHC 1070 (Admin), [2020] PTSR 240 [141] ff., concerning the appropriate standard of review where the Tameside duty is engaged, Stuart-Smith LJ also noted that, where the decision under challenge depends “essentially on political judgment” or involves “scientific, technical and predictive assessments” the decision-maker should be granted a wider margin of appreciation in relation to the inclusion or non-inclusion in the decision-making process of information on a particular subject [100]. Thornton J also recognised that in the context of a complex, scientific, predictive evaluation of the kind required when conducting an EIA for this kind of project, decision-makers must enjoy a wide margin of appreciation, and cited a number of other climate change cases where this principle had been stressed [271, 277]. Yet the two judges took very different views on whether UKEF had discharged its duty of enquiry, particularly as regards the calculation of Scope 3 emissions.

GHG emissions tend to be divided into three categories for the purposes of conducting environmental/climate impact assessments. The direct emissions associated with an activity or project fall within Scope 1. In this case that is the emissions associated with the extraction of LNG. In the Horse Hill oil well case it was the emissions associated with the construction of the well and associated buildings. Scope 2 emissions include the indirect emissions from the generation of purchased electricity in order to undertake the activity. Scope 3 are all indirect emissions not included in Scope 2, including the end-use of products produced by the activity.

In relation to the Mozambique LNG project, UKEF produced a climate change assessment report which posed the question: “what are the estimated Scope 3 GHG emissions of this project?”. However, the report ultimately declined to make an estimate on the basis that it would be “inaccurate and therefore likely to be misleading”. An associated environmental/human rights report stated that Scope 3 emissions could not be reported “due to considerable uncertainty in the measurement and reporting of these data”, which “could not be resolved without further analysis or due diligence” [301].

The question for the Court in the present case, therefore, was whether this failure to take Scope 3 emissions into consideration was unreasonable. Stuart-Smith LJ held that it was not. He considered that UKEF enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation over how it conducted its assessment of the climate change impacts of the proposed project in the present case, since “at the time there was no established or internationally recognised methodology for evaluating the climate change impacts of a project like the one under scrutiny” [103], and further held that quantification would not have added anything material to the qualitative assumptions made for the purpose of assessing compliance with the Paris Agreement [234].

By contrast, Thornton J noted that the UKEF climate report set itself the task of producing an impact assessment which would “fully acknowledge”, “fully consider” and “evidence” the climate change risks associated with the project so that they could be coherently presented to ministers but ultimately failed to deliver a proper assessment of those risks [332]. She pointed out that UKEF had neglected to estimate Scope 3 emissions, even though there did in fact exist a suitable methodology, in the form of the GHG Protocol used by many private-sector companies and endorsed by the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee [304].

Scope 3 emissions for the project were eventually calculated by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) after the Prime Minister requested advice on whether they could be offset. This calculation took just 24 hours and was completed on 30 June 2020, shortly before final approval for the project was given. The BEIS calculations indicated that the LNG extracted from the site would produce some 805 million tons of CO2 over the 25-year lifetime of the project, constituting no less than 0.2% of world’s entire remaining carbon budget if we are to stay within 1.5oC of warming. Yet the UKEF climate report was never amended to reflect this updated calculation [322–324].

Other flaws in the UKEF climate report were touched upon briefly, in particular its inconsistent assessments concerning the extent to which the Scope 3 emissions from the project would be offset by a reduction in the use of more polluting fuels. While the summary section suggests it is more likely than not that the project would lead to a net reduction in global emissions, the conclusion indicates that it may lead to such a reduction, and a passage quoting analysis by the US export credit agency, US EXIM, states that it is unlikely that the project would replace more polluting fuels and suggests that it might instead hamper the growth of renewables. These differing positions could lead to very different outcomes in relation to the UK’s ability to meet its obligations under the Paris Agreement [310–316].

In light of these ambiguities, and the failure to amend the report with the updated Scope 3 emissions calculation and send it back to ministers for reconsideration, Thornton J concluded that UKEF “failed to make reasonable and legally adequate enquiries in relation to a key consideration in the decision making (climate risks). The lack of information deprived Ministers of a legally adequate understanding of the scale of the emissions impact from the Project” [333].

The interpretation of the Paris Agreement

It is worth noting at this stage that the UK’s international commitments under the Paris Agreement have no automatic force in domestic law, but that the UK has adopted a legally-binding obligation under s.1(1) of the Climate Change Act 2008 to reach net zero emissions by 2050 and an obligation on the Secretary of State to set regular carbon budgets (s.4, CCA 2008). This means that decisions can be challenged in domestic courts on the basis of their failure to comply with these domestic climate obligations, although the Act is not prescriptive about the actions that ministers or officials must take to achieve net zero. However, as the parties in the present case agreed, compatibility with the provisions of unincorporated treaties can also be justiciable in certain circumstances.

Drawing together principles from a range of authorities, Stuart-Smith LJ held that, while there was no general rule that a national court shall never determine a question of interpretation of an unincorporated international treaty, it should adopt a lower intensity of review where the language of the treaty is broad and aspirational [119]. In such circumstances, the domestic court need only satisfy itself that the decision-maker’s interpretation of the relevant treaty provisions is “tenable”, rather than necessarily correct. Thornton J concurred that the correct test in the present circumstances was that of “tenability” [262] but the judges disagreed on whether the decision under challenge satisfied that test.

Stuart-Smith LJ held that “UKEF was entitled to form the view that the support for the Project that was in contemplation was in accordance with its obligations under the Paris Agreement as properly understood. That view was at least tenable” [240], while Thornton J concluded that “the failure to quantify the Scope 3 emissions, and the other flaws in the Climate Report mean that there was no rational basis by which to demonstrate that funding for the Project is consistent with Article 2(1)(c) of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and a pathway to low greenhouse gas emissions” [335].

Foreign Act of State doctrine

There was no disagreement on the third question, regarding the applicability of the Foreign Act of State doctrine. The Defendants submitted that the portion of Ground 1(a) concerning Mozambique’s commitments under the Paris Agreement was not justiciable, since it is not, as a matter of judicial policy, for the courts of this country to determine the legality of acts of a foreign government in the conduct of foreign affairs. After considering a range of case law on the doctrine, Stuart-Smith LJ held that, while the involvement of foreign state does not automatically preclude domestic courts from ruling on issues of foreign law, provided that there is a relevant “foothold” in domestic law in relation to the issue [130], it was not for a UK court to pronounce on whether the development of the LNG project would cause Mozambique to breach its own obligations under the Paris Agreement [232].

Where next?

So, what happens next? The split decision means that the judicial review did not succeed. However, the day after handing down its judgment, the High Court took the unusual step of issuing an order giving Friends of the Earth permission to appeal. Provided that FoE chooses to proceed, therefore, the Court of Appeal will settle the issue. Given the differing approaches taken by the judges in the lower court to Scope 3 emissions, it will be interesting to see how the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the present case interacts with its decision in Finch v Surrey County Council. Having declined to provide specific examples in that case of circumstances in which the connection between a proposed project and a putative effect might be sufficiently close to justify taking Scope 3 emissions into account when carrying out an EIA, the Court will now be forced to decide whether the connection between the planned project and the end-use emissions in the present case is so close as to make a decision to exclude them unreasonable.

The bar for success for such challenges is extremely high and the weight of recent case law is firmly against the Appellant. It would be foolish to try to predict the outcome of the appeal but, for all the reasons set out in my piece last October, one cannot help but suspect that it will be dismissed. However, given the manifest flaws in the UKEF climate change report and the scale of the GHG emissions that the project would produce, if ever there was a case to test the theory that the UK courts will never overturn a government decision on climate change grounds, this could be it.

What I’ve been up to this week

It is exam season on the Bar course, so much of my time has been taken up with preparing for assessments. But last Wednesday I took an evening off to go and see Ralph Fiennes in David Hare’s new play at the Bridge Theatre. In ‘Straight Line Crazy’, Fiennes plays Robert Moses, the hugely influential and controversial urban planner and master builder, whose decades-long career shaped much of the modern look and layout of the New York metropolitan area. After a slow start, the play worked its way up to a pretty devastating second act, and addressed many mid-twentieth-century arguments — about road-building, gentrification, access to the open space, and structural racism in planning — which are still awfully topical today.

Pupillage interviews: What to expect and how to make the most of them

As pupillage interview season gets underway in earnest, we share our experiences of the process in previous cycles, and ten tips for making the most out of your interviews.

Sam:

I made three rounds of applications for pupillage. During that time, I was very lucky, or unlucky, to experience more pupillage interviews than I now care to recall. In my first year, I had one first-round interview and one assessed mini-pupillage. As my CV and confidence improved and my number of applications increased over the next two years, so did my number of interviews. The more interviews I did, the more at ease I became and the more reliably (though not perfectly) I was able to do my best. We hope to accelerate this process for you so that, if you are blessed with your first interview, you are not held back by inexperience. We have listed any pieces of advice best framed as action-points under ten tips below. Here are my broad impressions of the process.  

First: Most sets of chambers hold two rounds of interviews before making offers of pupillage. There are thus three filter-points. Which applicants will be selected for a first-round interview on the basis of their form? Which first-round interviewees will be selected for a second-round interview? And which second-round interviewees will be offered pupillage or placed on the reserve list? Some sets of chambers invite applicants for an assessed mini-pupillage as part of the process. This results in a process with more filter-points. Between form, first interview, mini-pupillage, second interview and offers, there are five opportunities to assess an applicant.

Of these points, the first is usually numerically the most challenging. Most sets of chambers invite a small minority of applicants for an interview, perhaps 10%. So, in a sense, if you are invited to an interview, you have cleared the highest hurdle, and deserve to be proud of yourself for that. But your competition will be stiffer at the interview stage.

At the first round, applicants will typically be interviewed by between two and four members of chambers, usually junior barristers. At the second round, it is more common to have a larger panel, maybe as large as seven, and for it to include a silk or two. Sometimes a single panel interviews all the interviewees, but sometimes different barristers interview different applicants.  

What happens in a pupillage interview? Unhelpfully, it varies. As a general rule, a first-round interview is a short, conversational, competency-based interview, while a second interview involves an advocacy or legal analysis exercise prepared shortly before the interview. However, every set has its own procedure. Here are some kinds of questions or exercises that might arise in a pupillage interview.

1. Competency question. This will usually address relatively directly a criterion or sub-criterion from the list that the set uses to assess applicants. Some sets helpfully publish this list on their website so that applicants can assess their own prospects and complete their form and interview preparation with the benefit of knowing how they will be assessed. Examples of such questions: “When have you used advocacy skills to persuade someone of something?” or “Tell us about a time you showed integrity.” Motivational questions and questions about an applicant’s knowledge of the set and the bar fall under this category: “Why do you want to be a barrister?” or “Why have you applied to Shoe Lane Chambers?” or “What would you like your practice to be like in ten years’ time?”   

2. CV- or form-based question. The panel might want you to expand on some work experience that you mentioned on your application form by asking you what you learned from it, or ask you what your most valuable piece of experience has been. They might ask you to explain why a certain thing is missing from your CV, such as mooting experience, or, if they are feeling mean, they might ask why your exam marks during one year at university were not as good as they could have been.

3. Prepared exercise. You could be sent a question or topic to prepare to discuss shortly before your interview. You might have between 15 and 30 minutes to prepare. Sometimes you are given a choice of topics and sometimes not. This could be a legal problem question, or it might be a law-related discussion subject, e.g. “Should jury verdicts be appealable?” or “Should remedies be discretionary in public law?” or “Should the UK forbid the development of any new airports or runways?” Alternatively, you might be sent a judgment and asked to prepare to summarise it and give your opinion about it.

4. On-the-spot advocacy exercise. Similar to the above, except that you might be given thirty seconds in the interview room to sit with the topic and gather your thoughts, or no time at all.

5. Curveball. Not all sets do this, but sometimes you will be asked something about your personal life or opinions that apparently has nothing to do with working as a barrister. E.g. “What new show would you pitch to Netflix if you had the opportunity?” or “Who is your favourite fictional villain?” Such a question may just be a chance for the barristers to see you in a relaxed state (if only), but usually there will be a quality that they are looking to measure, such as advocacy skills or articulacy while thinking on the spot.

6. Do you have any questions for us? Applicants will very often be asked this question at the end of the interview. Opinions differ as to whether you should make sure to have a question ready, but it is definitely preferable to say no than to ask a question to which the answer is available online.

Lois:

I was extremely lucky to get a pupillage offer at my first attempt. I applied during my GDL year, having taken a rather circuitous route into law. After completing a PhD on medieval bishops, I spent three years working as a policy officer in the non-profit sector. It was only when I was working from home during the first lockdown and contemplating the fact that I would be turning 30 the next year that I decided to take the plunge and pursue a career at the Bar.

I knew from my time working in policy that I had a broad interest in public law and a particular interest in planning and environmental work. I applied to nine sets, each of which specialised in this area to a greater or lesser extent, and received six invitations to first-round interview. The interview invitations were spread over quite a long period, so don’t panic if you haven’t yet heard back from your favourite sets. They may just be taking their time to shortlist. I ended up being called back for second rounds at some sets before I’d even had my first-round interviews at others.

The first round

My first-round interviews were all with panels of two or three mostly junior barristers. They were each around 20 to 30 minutes long, but the interviewing styles varied widely, as did the type and number of questions I was asked.

My first interview comprised a mixture of competency questions, looking for examples of skills that the chambers had not asked about on its application form, and questions testing candidates’ awareness of current affairs and legal news. I was also asked to talk about a time when I had had to apply a complex area of law and then explain said area of law to the panel. The most disconcerting aspect of this interview was how inscrutable the panel were. I emerged with absolutely no idea how I had done.

Another set filled the time with a ten-minute presentation and follow-up questions on one of a choice of five topics sent to candidates 30 minutes before the interview, followed by only three other questions. The interviewers were extremely friendly and provided lots of positive reinforcement. In fact, the whole thing felt more like having a conversation than doing an interview.

At a third chambers, a panel of three (who had obviously read my form carefully) kicked things off by asking me a charmingly whimsical question about whether I thought eleventh-century bishops would like the modern planning system, before firing tricky questions at me for twenty minutes and pushing back hard on many of my answers. The aim of this interview was clearly to see how candidates coped under pressure, more than trying to elicit any particular ‘right answers’.

Finally, there was the set which asked a series of disarming questions designed to elicit information about what candidates were like as people beyond what they had written on their application forms. They closed the interview by asking me to talk about a book I found emotionally meaningful, so of course every book I had ever read immediately fled my brain. I somehow found myself talking about my love of Lord of the Rings and emerged feeling very glad that I would never have to be cross-examined by the interview panel!

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the two sets where I felt that I had given my most predictable, generic and rehearsed answers were also the two that did not call me back for a second round. (Is completing my PhD really the achievement I am most proud of? To be honest, I am still not sure). I guess the moral of the story is to let your personality show a bit. And to talk about hobbits where possible…

The second round

Second round interviews tend to be longer than first rounds, though this isn’t always the case. At the chambers from which I eventually received an offer I was in and out in 20 minutes and convinced I had blown it because I had been told in advance that they were 40-minute slots. It is definitely wise not to second-guess how you have done from the length of the interview.

All four of my second rounds involved some form of advance preparation. Mostly this entailed reading a case or a problem question shortly in advance of the interview and then responding to questions about it, but one set required candidates to carry out a pre-prepared advocacy exercise on an unfamiliar area of law and submit a skeleton argument several days ahead of the interview.

The interview panels stayed fairly small for three of my second rounds, but at one set a panel of nine had the privilege of watching me spectacularly screw up my answer to a legal ethics question. If you are applying before you start the Bar course, I would highly recommend finding someone to practice ethics questions with ahead of time.

On the whole, my second-round interviews involved a lot more legal analysis than my first rounds and also more practical advocacy. Even at sets where I wasn’t asked to prepare for a formal ‘advocacy exercise’ I ended up having to do something akin to one, whether it was presenting submissions for a hypothetical appeal against a judgment given to me ahead of the interview, summarising the argument of my PhD thesis in two minutes, or responding to the question “what is the point of the National Housing Federation?” (my former employer) in one. All these were, in their various ways, testing candidates’ ability to think on their feet and prioritise their strongest arguments.

Across both first and second rounds I also received a number of questions aimed at testing candidates’ understanding of what barristers actually do, from how I would feel about acting for clients whose views and interests did not align with my own or those of my previous employers, to whether I would rather do more court or inquiry work, to what I would find most difficult about a career at the Bar. As Sam mentioned above, it is definitely not essential to ask a question at the end. I didn’t in any of my interviews and I certainly wouldn’t recommend trying to come up with a question just for the sake of it.

Overall, I enjoyed the interview process much more than I expected to. The intellectual challenge and variety of pupillage interviews made a nice change of pace after several years of more conventional job interviews and my interviewers were mostly lovely. I feel that coming to the process as a mature student definitely helped me to feel more at ease and I was relieved to find that my slightly unconventional CV and relative lack of legal work experience didn’t count against me.

Image from the excellent Defending the Guilty.

Ten tips:

  • Structure your answers. Barristers are in general obsessed with the number three. Not all answers will lend themselves to this kind of structure, but if you can divide your answer into two, three or four parts, begin your answer by saying “I have two/three/four points”, then say “my first point is” or “firstly” before each one, your answer will not only be much easier for the panel to understand than otherwise, but you will also sound more like the panel’s idea of a barrister yourself. If this becomes a lifelong habit that wins over judges and loses you friends, so be it.
  • Keep your answers short and sweet. Applicants’ answers are often too long. You may have a lot of worthwhile things to say, but if you wait to be interrupted by the panel, you may never finish speaking. This is especially the case if it is an unexpected question and you are building the road in front of you as you speak, but even a question like “Why do you want to be a barrister?” only wants a few snappy points or an easy-to-follow narrative. A little practice with a friend or listening back to your own recorded answers can help you to identify when you could be more concise. 
  • Re-read and annotate your form. Link the achievements you have included on your form to as many competencies as you can think of. You may be asked for examples of times you’ve demonstrated skills which are not explicitly addressed in the questions on the form. Identify anything particularly interesting or unusual that is likely to elicit a question. If you are an expert on eleventh-century bishops or keen on animal law, you are likely to get a lot of questions about this, so it pays to decide in advance how you can best pitch what makes you unique.
  • Plan answers to likely questions. You may get some curveball questions (as Sam discussed above) but a lot of questions will be predictable. You will be asked why you want to be a barrister, why a particular area of law, why a particular set? You don’t need to script answers to these questions word for word, but make sure you have clearly identified the key points you will make in response to each. Consider practicing with friends and family members, so that your responses will seem considered without seeming scripted. It’s also well worth writing down what questions you were asked immediately after each interview. It will help you prepare should you encounter them again.
  • All experience is useful experience. You may find yourself competing against people with significantly more legal work experience than you, or who have come top of their year on the Bar course, or won a whole host of moots. Try not to panic about this. An unconventional CV is not necessarily a disadvantage. It may help to make you stand out. Apparently unrelated jobs and hobbies can also provide a wealth of relevant examples of times you have demonstrated the skills needed to become a successful barrister. Teaching a class of 30 students means you can work under pressure, convey complex information clearly, and think on your feet. Running your own jewellery-making business on the side shows that you are self-motivated and know how to market yourself effectively. Volunteering at a local homeless shelter demonstrates your integrity and emotional intelligence.
  • Present yourself professionally. Expressions like this are laden with cultural assumptions. You should not try to be someone you aren’t or to fit what you think, or what you think others think, is the model of a barrister. Every aspect of your character that distinguishes you from the historically average barrister is something for you and the bar to embrace. What I mean is that you should treat the panel with respect, as in any job interview. This includes dressing as you would on a mini-pupillage or on work experience with solicitors. Suits are essential, unless you are specifically informed otherwise, and should be worn with a shirt and tie, a white blouse, or a dark dress underneath. 
  • Remember that interviewers are human too. They may have a particularly stressful case coming up next week. They may be relatively junior juniors interviewing for the first time alongside more senior members of chambers and anxious to make a good impression. Many pupillage interviews take place outside of ordinary working hours and that means that the panel are giving up some of their limited free time to interview you. Be polite, appreciative and empathetic. Remember that these will be your future colleagues if you are successful.
  • Try to relax. If this is not possible, try to appear relaxed, and you may find that you forget to feel nervous a few minutes in. There is no point pretending that there isn’t a power imbalance in the interview room, but the panel will be trying to identify applicants who could, in a couple of years, inspire confidence in professional and lay clients and hold their own in front of a grumpy judge. Be polite and respectful, but not meek. 
  • Do not worry if you have a difficult interview. If the panel pushes you to or beyond your limit, it is because they think you are worth pushing. If you spend the whole interview in your comfort zone, you may not have the opportunity to show your best. So if you feel out of your depth at any point, calm yourself by remembering that it is part of the process for everyone who eventually succeeds.
  • Give yourself credit. Many sets get hundreds of applications every year. To have got to the interview stage at all is a huge achievement. The interview process can be gruelling and it’s important to take time to celebrate your successes. Similarly, try not to take rejections at any stage too personally. There is always an element of chance. Sometimes a panel has to make a call between two apparently equal applicants, for example on the basis that one of them fits the culture of chambers better, which is very hard for applicants to gauge. It also only takes one super-applicant (an experienced solicitor or well-known academic in a relevant field) to change everyone’s prospects in a given year.

The birds and the bees: Biodiversity Net Gain in practice

After a long process of scrutiny, debate and amendment, the Environment Act 2021 (“the Act”) finally received royal assent on the 9th November last year. It sets out a statutory framework for post-Brexit environmental protection and regulation, to be overseen by the newly created Office for Environmental Protection.[1] Some of the provisions of the Act simply carry over existing protections from EU legislation, but others are genuinely new. One of the new provisions concerns mandatory Biodiversity Net Gain (BNG) requirements to be introduced as a condition of planning permission. The principle behind these requirements is that new developments should leave the natural environment in a measurably better state than they found it in order to be acceptable in planning terms.

The relevant provisions in the Act itself are to be found at Part 6: sections 98–101 and Schedule 14 and are summarised below.

  • The Town and Country Planning Act 1990 has been amended to introduce a mandatory minimum 10% gain in biodiversity.
  • The requirement that this gain be calculated according to Natural England’s Biodiversity Metric 3.0 and that the proposed steps to be taken to achieve it are set out in a developer’s ‘Biodiversity Gain Plan’.
  • BNG will be deliverable on-site, off-site, or via the purchase of ‘biodiversity credits’ from central government.
  • Habitats delivered via the policy are to be secured for at least thirty years via planning obligations or conservation covenants.
  • Biodiversity gain sites will be registered on a newly established national public register. 

The policy is due to come into force in November 2023 but, notwithstanding the provisions of the Environment Act, many details of its operation are yet to be fleshed out via secondary legislation. Defra is currently consulting on how BNG will work in practice.[2] The subject is a complex and technical one and I do not profess to be any kind of expert, but in the remainder of this piece I hope to provide an overview of the scope and some of the key features of what is being proposed, as well as considering a few potential barriers to the successful implementation of the policy and the adequacy or otherwise of the government’s proposed solutions.

What kinds of development are covered by the new proposals?

Under current proposals, the new BNG requirements will apply to a wider range of developments than initially anticipated when the Environment Bill was first tabled. For example, a government amendment introduced in June of last year expanded the requirement to include Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects (NSIPs). Defra’s consultation document notes that there may be circumstances where a particular NSIP is unable to deliver the 10% minimum BNG required from schemes delivered through the normal planning process but prefers a reduced percentage target in such circumstances to a blanket exception for large scale projects [p. 41]. One can only imagine the number of planning inquiries which are likely to arise after the introduction of the policy, dealing with the question of whether a particular percentage target is appropriate in a given set of circumstances Crucially, however, 10% will remain the baseline target, even for NSIPs.

The government is also now proposing to apply the 10% target to schemes on brownfield sites, despite previously considering exempting such developments from BNG requirements. The rationale behind the change is that brownfield exemptions would “deliver little added benefit and would greatly complicate the requirement’s scope for developers and planning authorities alike” as well as a stated desire for the policy to benefit people as well as wildlife, by improving the biodiversity of sites in urban and suburban areas, where brownfield land tends to be concentrated [p. 26]. Previously considered exemptions for temporary planning permissions and schemes in conservation areas and national parks have also been abandoned.[3]

Some exceptions remain in the consultation proposals, including householder planning applications such as extensions and permitted development, the former presumably in the interests of avoiding unfairness to individual householders for the sake of minimal benefits, and the latter because permitted development rights operate outside of the usual planning process and do not normally involve substantial additional land take or construction work. Defra is also considering exemptions for self-build, custom build, and the creation of biodiversity gain sites themselves (the role of these sites is discussed more fully below) [pp. 23–27]. Nevertheless, the consultation document seems to indicate a commitment to apply the policy more widely than many in the environmental and development sectors had previously anticipated.

How will the policy work?

The consultation document makes clear that the new statutory BNG requirement is designed to complement the existing biodiversity mitigation hierarchy set out in paragraph 180a of the National Planning Policy Framework. Developers should in all cases aim to avoid or reduce biodiversity impacts through site selection and layout. In terms of meeting their 10% BNG target, they should preferably seek to do so through on-site improvements, with the resulting habitats being secured for at least thirty years via planning obligations or conservation covenants. In the event that on-site delivery is not feasible, developers will be permitted to meet the requirement off-site, either through improvements elsewhere on their land, or by purchasing off-site benefits to be achieved via biodiversity gain sites elsewhere. As a last resort, if no other option is feasible, they may purchase biodiversity credits from central Government. The biodiversity gains and losses of a development will be measured in ‘biodiversity units’, using Natural England’s Biodiversity Metric 3.0. This metric uses habitats as a proxy for biodiversity and calculates units by taking account of their type, extent and condition. Developers will be able to purchase biodiversity units on the market when meeting their BNG target via off-site contributions.

Under the new policy, all applications for planning permission which do not fall under one of the proposed exceptions will need to provide initial BNG information, including:

  • the pre-development biodiversity value,
  • the proposed approach to enhancing biodiversity on-site, and
  • any proposed off-site biodiversity enhancements (including the use of statutory credits) that have been planned or arranged for the development.

To fully discharge the new planning condition, local planning authorities will need to approve a development’s biodiversity gain plan. These plans should offer a more detailed road map for how the developer proposes to achieve the benefits to biodiversity indicated as part of their initial planning application. The consultation document contains a template plan at Annex B. The approval of a biodiversity gain plan must take place before development starts [p. 13].

Biodiversity gain sites will be registered on a newly established Public Biodiversity Gain Site Register, to aid enforcement and avoid double counting. In the interests of transparency, the register will be designed so that local communities are able to access information on the delivery of sites and monitor their progress over time. 

Will the policy be effective?

While the introduction of the mandatory BNG policy has been broadly welcomed in the environmental sector, conservationists and biodiversity experts have raised a number of serious issues with the current proposals and questioned the efficacy of the government’s proposed solutions to them. A non-exhaustive list of these issues includes fears over the loss of irreplaceable habitats, the design of the algorithm for Natural England’s Biodiversity Metric, delays in the delivery of replacement habitats, and the challenges of enforcement.[4]

Irreplaceable habitats

As noted above, the new BNG policy is supposed to complement existing planning protections for habitats and the mitigation hierarchy enshrined in the NPPF, not replace them. Campaigners and academics alike have called on the government to take this opportunity to firm up its commitment to protecting irreplaceable habitats such as ancient woodland, blanket bog, limestone pavement, sand dunes, salt marsh and lowland fen, arguing that it should be all but impossible for developers to achieve planning permission for schemes which would result in the destruction of these vital ecosystems.

Irreplaceable habits have been removed from scope of the current BNG consultation, so as not to give the impression that losses in such habitats can be offset in the usual way. However, when a development results in losses of both irreplaceable and non-irreplaceable habitat, the BNG requirement will still apply to any affected non-irreplaceable habitat. Defra has promised supporting guidance on what constitutes irreplaceability and proposed to adopt a bespoke compensation approach where developments would lead to the loss of irreplaceable habitat. The consultation document suggests that the appropriate compensation would typically exceed standard BNG requirements [p. 31].

While the recognition that the value of irreplaceable habitats for biodiversity cannot be assessed in terms of standard units under the general Biodiversity Metric is welcome, the language of ‘compensation’ and refusal to tighten restrictions on the destruction of such habitats is deeply concerning. The value to nature of an acre of ancient woodland cannot be adequately compensated in money, no matter how many trees one pays to plant. Without stronger protections, there is a very real risk that developers of schemes which are likely to be particularly profitable, but which will also lead to irreplaceable habitat loss, will be quite content to throw money at the problem in the form of compensation.

The Biodiversity Metric

Many rewilding experts have raised serious concerns over the way that Natural England’s algorithm calculates the value of a given habitat for biodiversity. The algorithm uses information about the type, size and condition of a habitat to assign it a number, defining how valuable it supposedly is for biodiversity.  However, critics have warned that the new Biodiversity Metric does not value scrubby landscapes characterised by bramble, thistle and ragwort, which are often key features of rewilding projects. Such characteristics are logged as a sign of the ‘degradation’ of a landscape. In this respect the algorithm privileges more traditional conservation projects over innovative rewilding schemes, which seems a great shame when these projects can actually provide some of the most genuine and lasting benefits for biodiversity.

Speaking to the Guardian, entomologist Steven Falk noted that quarries and field margins were among habitats undervalued by the algorithm and labelled as ‘degraded’, despite being very rich for wildlife. He highlighted the risk that assessments based on the Biodiversity Metric would therefore conclude that such habitats did not need to be compensated for at all.

The algorithm also does not take into account the location or interconnectedness of a habitat. Scrubland next to a carpark and scrubland in the middle of a large rewilding project would consequently be afforded the same purported value for biodiversity under the current metric, even though the difference in their actual value would be transparently obvious to a human observer assessing them in their physical context.

Delay and enforcement

The government’s stated aim is for net gains to be delivered quickly.The consultation document proposes that on-site gains should be secured for delivery within 12 months of the development being commenced or, at the very least, before occupation. Biodiversity gain plans will have to set out a full timetable for implementation of their proposed measures. Any delay in the creation of replacement habitats for longer than 12 months will have to be reflected in the biodiversity metric calculation, meaning that developers who delay will ultimately have to pay more [p. 54].

However, the issue of delay in the delivery of offsets is closely linked to that of enforcement. Planning departments and councils are underfunded, understaffed and overstretched already. The introduction of the new BNG policy will leave them with yet another mandatory consideration to assess at the decision-taking stage and there is a danger that local planning authorities have neither the time nor the expertise to do it properly.

When Rebecca Moberly, principal consultant for the Planning Advisory Service (PAS), was quoted in a recent piece for ENDS report, she expressed her concern that the proposals for the implementation of the policy are too vague to be properly enforceable and that developers and landowners might be able to fudge the numbers. “We still don’t know if this will be part of the planning process or something separate,” Moberly said. “Developers might say they have done it, but who is going to check it? And if it has not happened, who will make sure it does happen?” If fears about the lack of capacity in the system prove to be justified, then delays in the delivery of off-sets may prove to be the least of environmentalists’ worries.

Alongside the publication of the its consultation document, the government announced a new £4 million funding pot to help local authorities with implementation costs. This works out at a rather meagre £10,000 per local authority, which hardly seems sufficient to cover the cost of enforcing a whole new governance framework.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that when ecological economist Sophus zu Ermgassen and a team of researchers from the University of Kent assessed 6% of the housebuilding in England between January 2020 and February 2021, in six local authorities who had adopted the BNG scheme ahead of its national rollout, they found evidence of a governance gap and that promised biodiversity units were not being delivered. Overall, they found that BNG developments led to a 34% reduction in green space, offset by promises of a 20% increase in total biodiversity through the theoretical delivery of smaller but more ecologically valuable habitats. Whether or not these promised gains will materialise remains to be seen.


The BNG policy has the potential to lead to some genuinely positive outcomes in terms of habitat creation, especially where a development takes place on denuded agricultural land (and an awful lot of land in England is exactly that). If properly enforced, it could constitute a valuable source of funding for conservation, rewilding and habitat creation projects. Or it could turn out to be unwieldy, overly financialized, and ultimately unenforceable, allowing developers to destroy thriving ecosystems and interconnected habitats and then plant a few trees elsewhere or buy a few extra credits. If the policy is to be more than greenwash, there needs to be proper government support available to local authorities to enforce it and decision makers must prioritise ecological outcomes when assessing whether a given development meets its obligations. Otherwise the risk is that all BNG will create is a low quality market in off-sets.


[1] Analysis of the range of targets included in the Act and of the objectives, functions and draft strategy of the OEP can be found in two recent posts on FTB’s Environmental Law Blog.

[2] Defra, Consultation on Biodiversity Net Gain Regulations, closes 5 April 2022. Page ranges given in square brackets refer to this document.

[3] Conservation areas for this purpose include Sites of Special Scientific Interest, Special Areas of Conservation, Special Protection Areas and Marine Conservation Zones.

[4] These issues and others are addressed in a case study of six early-adopter councils already implementing mandatory BNG policies by Sophus zu Ermgassen et al., ‘Exploring the ecological outcomes of mandatory biodiversity net gain using evidence from early-adopter jurisdictions in England‘, Conservation Letters, Vol. 14, June 2021.

Section 21 and the Supported Housing Sector

In April 2019 Theresa May’s Government announced its plans to repeal Section 21 of the Housing Act 1988 (as amended by the Housing Act 1996) and put an end to so-called ‘no fault evictions’. Long controversial, Section 21 allows landlords to evict tenants who have assured shorthold tenancies (ASTs):

  1. after a fixed term tenancy comes to an end, provided there is a written contract; or
  1. during a periodic tenancy (i.e. a tenancy with no fixed end date).

The landlord must give the tenant 2 months’ notice in writing but does not have to provide any reason for the eviction.[1] The provision is subject to some caveats and safeguards to protect the rights of tenants but, even taking these into account, it still allows for the eviction of tenants who have taken good care of a property, kept up with rent payments, and abided by all the conditions of their tenancy. This is in contrast with the provision under Section 8 of the 1988 Act, which states that a landlord can only commence proceedings to take possession of a property let on an assured tenancy if one of the limited range of grounds in Schedule 2 of the Act applies.

Being required to move with only 2 months’ notice would no doubt be a headache for anyone, but it can take a particular toll on families with school-age children, disabled people, people living in rural areas with a shortage of rented accommodation, and people living in poverty, who may struggle to find alternative accommodation within their budget and can ill afford to pay the extra costs associated with moving. It is no surprise therefore that the announcement that the Government planned to abolish Section 21 was widely celebrated by housing charities and campaigners.

Coming up to three years later, however, and the provision remains in force, despite the pledge to repeal it being repeated in the Conservative manifesto for the 2019 general election.[2] The 2021 Queen’s Speech promised that the Government would respond to its 2019 consultation on the issue and publish a White Paper by the end of the year, but in October 2021 it was announced that the White Paper would be delayed until 2022.[3] Meanwhile, analysis of Ministry of Justice figures by the Big Issue Foundation found that some 25,000 Section 21 notices were issued between the April 2019 announcement and November 2021, while campaigning organisation Generation Rent have suggested that rising eviction rates since Covid-related protections were removed could result in one no-fault eviction every 32 minutes this winter. This is an especially grim state of affairs given that, for a while, it seemed that the pandemic had shifted the conversation on poverty and homelessness and highlighted the inequities and insecurities faced by private renters, especially those living at the lower end of the market.

But if the focus of the promised reform is on protecting private renters, what does all this have to do with supported housing? It turns out quite a lot, as I discovered when I spent a year working in the policy team at the National Housing Federation between September 2019 and September 2020, covering supported housing among other policy areas. The NHF is the trade body for England’s housing associations, representing around 900 members ranging from major social landlords managing over 100,000 homes, to small specialist providers with just a handful of properties.

Many of its members also provide supported housing, either exclusively or alongside general needs accommodation. This wide-ranging term can be used to refer to any accommodation where housing-related support is provided as part of a tenancy. Housing associations deliver around 70% of England’s supported housing, including sheltered and extra care housing for older and disabled people, homeless hostels, mental health stepdown units and domestic abuse refuges.[4] Of the rest, around 20% is owned and managed by local authorities, and the remaining 10% by a mixture of private and voluntary sector organisations. The kinds of support offered in these schemes vary widely, but they include job coaching and skills development training, counselling and wellbeing checks. They are all aimed at helping residents maintain their tenancies and live as independently as possible. For many residents in supported schemes, the only viable alternative would be residential care, hospital or another secure institution.

For a type of housing designed to meet the needs of some of the most vulnerable groups in society, it might seem strange to learn that supported housing providers quite often let properties via ASTs. One might assume that security of tenure would be paramount in such schemes and indeed many supported homes, especially sheltered and extra care housing for older people, are let on a lifetime basis. However, there are a number of reasons why supported housing providers might need to take possession of a property urgently, even where a resident has not fallen behind on their rent or otherwise breached their agreement with the landlord. They can be roughly divided into four themes, though there is some overlap.[5]

  1. Loss of support

Funding for support services in supported accommodation can be withdrawn for planned or unexpected reasons. Commissioning cycles have a role to play, local authority-commissioned services often being made available to clients for a maximum period of two years, after which they are expected to be able to live independently or their landlord is expected to help them find appropriate accommodation to move onto. In these circumstances, it is always understood that the tenancy will only last for the maximum period for which support is available. Sometimes, however, support may be withdrawn unexpectedly. This can occur where support services are funded or directly provided by an external agency, which suddenly ceases to operate for reasons beyond the control of the housing association. Whether or not the cessation of funding is anticipated, the fact remains that many residents in supported housing are not in a position to maintain their tenancies without the correct support services in place. Tenancies which continue unsupported risk breaking down in a chaotic way which can be harmful and traumatic for residents and costly for social landlords.

  1. Residents’ changing support needs

Different types of supported housing offer different services, some much more intensive than others. Sometimes during the course of a tenancy, a resident’s support needs may evolve. They might start out in a high-support service and over time discover that they are able to live more independently. Conversely it may become apparent that they require a greater level of support than their current housing provider is able to offer. Ideally residents in this position will be able to move into more appropriate accommodation by mutual consent, but sometimes a resident might be understandably reluctant to move. In such circumstances housing providers may seek to terminate a tenancy, in the interests of ensuring that residents are properly supported and that very limited supported housing stock is allocated as fairly and effectively as possible.

  1. Safety of other residents

Some client groups in supported housing can suffer from serious mental and physical health challenges, substance misuse issues and potentially chaotic behaviour. In services designed to be temporary, residents with very high support needs, which pose a potential risk to their own safety or that of others, will often be given a licence to occupy rather than a tenancy agreement. However, in certain circumstances, even in schemes which are intended to offer long-term or lifelong support, staff may feel that they need to evict a resident at short notice for the protection of other residents. Section 21 is far from an ideal mechanism in such circumstances, but it does offer greater speed than Section 8 proceedings and greater certainty than an application for an emergency injunction. 

  1. Long-term unavailability of the property

Supported housing schemes can sometimes have rather complex operational models, whereby buildings are leased and services such as care, mental health provision, housing management support or skills training are subcontracted to other organisations. It is far from unusual for a scheme to have a housing association landlord but a charity or private agency providing housing management and support services. Likewise, it is common for housing associations to lease supported housing properties from a freeholder for a number of years, after which it must be restored to the freeholder with vacant possession, or to lease properties the value of which is affected by ‘planning blight’ because they are in the proposed path of a significant publicly-funded infrastructure project. All of these models allow providers to keep services running in a very challenging funding environment, but they also mean that it is not always possible for landlords to guarantee their residents full security of tenure.

If Section 21 is repealed and no thought is given by Government to the peculiarities of supported housing provision, there is a risk that providers may start to offer more licences and fewer tenancies, giving residents even less security than they would have under an AST. Worse still, providers dealing with especially complex leasing arrangements or precarious funding streams might simply stop providing services altogether. It is therefore to be sincerely hoped that the anticipated White Paper will give serious consideration to the issue.

When we consulted with members during my time at the NHF, there were a range of opinions on potential ways forward. There was fairly widespread agreement that Section 21 is a blunt instrument, which is not especially well-suited to the requirements of the supported housing sector, but also a high level of concern over what the impact might be if all supported housing tenancies effectively became lifetime tenancies overnight.

There was a degree of enthusiasm for the idea of creating a specific new ‘supported housing tenancy’, which might sit alongside some of the other specialist provisions considered in the Government’s 2019 consultation document, for example relating to private lettings to students, the sub-letting of farm buildings by tenant farmers, and the letting out of property designed for use by religious workers during periods of non-use for that purpose.[6] The idea was that the existence of the tenancy might be tied in some way to the ongoing provision of support services. However, it quickly became apparent that creating a single tenancy type to cover the vast array of service models encompassed by the term ‘supported housing’ was likely to be all but impossible.

Retaining ASTs for supported housing providers, while abolishing them for everyone else, seemed highly unlikely to be acceptable to the Government, and would leave social landlords in the morally questionable position of offering less security of tenure than private renters would automatically enjoy after the new measures came into force. Excluding tenancies in supported housing schemes from assured status, and therefore from statutory security, by adding them to the list of exclusions in Schedule 1 of the 1988 Act, would raise even greater moral objections. Schedule 1 sets out a range of tenancies which cannot be assured, including student lettings which are specifically tied to a course of study, holiday lets and licensed premises. Such tenancies can be terminated by a simple notice to quit. While potentially rather practical, adding accommodation for some of the most vulnerable people in society to the list of tenancy types which cannot be assured would be difficult to defend from a political and moral perspective.

That leaves adding a new mandatory ground for possession to Schedule 2 of the 1988 Act as the most workable solution. This schedule sets out a range of grounds on which a landlord can issue a notice seeking possession under Section 8 of the Act. Some, such as Ground 7A concerning anti-social behaviour and Ground 8 concerning serious rent arrears, relate to breaches of the tenancy agreement by an assured tenant. Others deal with circumstances where possession is legally necessary, even if the tenant has done nothing wrong. For example, Ground 2 allows for possession by a mortgagee where the landlord has defaulted on payments on a mortgage on the property which predates the tenancy.

While Section 8 proceedings are not as expeditious as a Section 21 notice, introducing a new mandatory ground for possession for supported housing would at least ensure that providers had some mechanism for moving residents on in circumstances where funding for support had been withdrawn, resident safety demanded it, or a building was no longer available. In its response to the Government consultation on this issue, the NHF provided some suggested wording for the proposed ground and suggested that it ought to apply only to non-profit landlords (namely charities and community benefit societies), to prevent poorly regulated for-profit providers from exploiting it as a loophole in the new law. In practice, it seems probable that any such provision would have to be worded in such a way as to encompass local authority landlords too. Crucially, however, the new ground would be limited to circumstances where

  1. the purpose of granting the tenancy is from the outset explicitly limited to that of providing temporary accommodation (specifically defined); or
  2. the tenancy is a designated short-term tenancy; or
  3. the tenant relies for the successful maintenance of the tenancy or for their own safety and wellbeing on support that is provided by or for the landlord by means of funding by an agency independent of the landlord and not subject to its influence or control, or is provided directly by such an agency, and the agency ceases to fund or provide the support; or
  4. the tenant relies for the successful maintenance of the tenancy or for their own safety and wellbeing on support and this support is no longer available; or
  5. the support that is provided to the tenant is not in line with the tenant’s needs. [7]

In any of these circumstances, the tenant would also need to have been given written notice in the tenancy agreement, or in a separate document served at the same time, that this ground might be used. The idea behind drawing the circumstances in which the proposed ground would apply fairly narrowly is to ensure that supported housing residents would only be subject to no-fault possession in very limited circumstances in which housing could not otherwise be provided for them.

This seems like a relatively fair compromise and, crucially, does not leave thousands of extremely vulnerable people with less security of tenure than they have at present. Nevertheless, what struck me very strongly while working on the Section 21 repeal consultation with members at the NHF, and afterwards reading the briefing that my colleagues produced on the subject, was how many of the challenges facing the supported housing sector as a whole have been thrown into sharp relief by the proposed abolition of no-fault evictions. If the supported housing sector enjoyed adequate and consistent revenue funding, then residents would not be required to leave at short notice because support services had been unexpectedly terminated. If there was capital funding available to increase the supply of purpose-built accommodation, then providers would not be so acutely constrained by the need to manage their limited stock effectively. If local authority commissioners took a strategic approach to assessing the need for housing-related support services and commissioned them accordingly, perhaps the sector would be less reliant on piecemeal lease-based arrangements. A recent House of Commons Library briefing paper on Section 21 at least acknowledged the need to consider supported housing tenancies when implementing legislative changes in this area. It is to be hoped that one of the tangential consequences of the forthcoming White Paper will be to foster a new appreciation for the sector.


What I’ve been reading….

Over Christmas I read The Topeka School, a semi-autobiographical novel by American poet and author Ben Lerner. Lerner’s roots as a poet definitely show. The novel is beautifully written, offering vivid portraits of the lives of its cast of characters as it jumps between perspectives and time periods. It is also fascinated by the idea of language itself, its many uses and the power it can bestow on those who know how to use it well. And it’s extremely funny. Definitely recommended.


[1] It should be noted that, due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the notice periods that landlords were required to give tenants were temporarily extended for landlords who gave their tenants notice between 26 March 2020 and 30 September 2021.

[2] Conservative Party Manifesto 2019, p. 29.

[3] For a full timeline and summary of the measures consulted on to date, see House of Commons Library Research Briefing by Cassie Barton & Wendy Wilson, ‘The end of ‘no fault’ section 21 evictions‘, 29 December 2021.

[4] The figure is taken from the DWP & DCLG Supported Accommodation Review, November 2016, but it seems unlikely that it has changed significantly in the intervening years.

[5] Further detail can be found in NHF Renters’ Reform strategy: Proposal for providers of supported housing and temporary accommodation, June 2021.

[6] See MHCLG, A New Deal for Renting Resetting the balance of rights and responsibilities between landlords and tenants: A consultation, July 2019, pp. 40–43.

[7] NHF Renters’ Reform strategy: Proposal for providers of supported housing and temporary accommodation, June 2021, p. 19.

Image credit: “Key to the open door” by Tawheed Manzoor is licensed under CC BY 2.0

Burning down the house: Should ecocide be an international crime?

Last week on 22nd November I attended a webinar on ‘The Crime of Ecocide’, as part of Inner Temple’s Social Context of the Law series. For those with eighty minutes or so to spare, the recording is publicly available online and well worth watching in full.

I had encountered the word ‘ecocide’ fairly frequently in activist circles.[1] I was also aware that a campaign exists to make it a criminal offence. However, going into the webinar I realised how little I actually knew about the substance of the campaign, the history of the concept, the individuals responsible for pioneering it, or how it might operate in practice. Happily, the webinar answered many of the questions I had going in, and plenty more besides.

Sir Geoffrey Nice QC, moderating the session, began by reflecting on the frustrations of COP26 and the scale of the climate and biodiversity emergencies, and noted that “the urgency of these matters under consideration no longer allows for the passage of time”. He posed a question which must surely have occurred to every practitioner seeking to use the law as an instrument for progress on environmental issues. Is the law going to be able to work fast enough to deal with these challenges, or do we have to think about alternatives? Dealing with shortness of time and the need for implementable solutions were common themes which came out strongly in the talks of both speakers and in many of the questions posed by the audience at the end of the session.

The first speaker was Professor Philippe Sands QC. He began his talk by explaining that the concept of ecocide has a fairly long history, having first been raised in the late 1960s in the context of the Vietnam War and the use of Agent Orange by the United States military. As an aside, it is surely no coincidence that Vietnam was the first of ten countries around the world which have, to date, adopted ecocide into their domestic criminal law as a specific offence. It is defined in Article 278 of the Vietnam Penal Code 1990 as “destroying the natural environment, whether committed in time of peace or war.” The term itself was coined in 1970 by the American academic Professor Arthur W. Galston, who viewed it as being analogous to genocide, and it gained widespread recognition after Olof Palme, then Prime Minister of Sweden, used it to refer to what was happening in Vietnam at the United Nations Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment in 1972.

However, Prof Sands explained that the concept remained somewhat marginal for several decades after the Stockholm Conference. He recounted a conversation in 1991 with the late great Professor Ian Brownlie about why his Principles of Public International Law contained nothing on environmental law and being told that it was because public international environmental law simply didn’t exist. After the International Court of Justice ruled that that the environmental principle of prevention was part of customary international law in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons in 1996, the subject did appear in the fifth edition of the textbook in 1998, but it was allotted just four pages. In 1998, when the preamble to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was drafted, it was felt to be premature to include specific references to ecocide or to environmental crimes more broadly.

After the Rome Statute was drafted, however, the late Polly Higgins, a pioneering barrister and campaigner, took up the notion of ecocide and began to campaign for its widespread acceptance and adoption by relevant law-making institutions. The campaign is still spearheaded by Stop Ecocide International, the organisation she co-founded along with its current chief executive Jojo Mehta, and its charitable sister-organisation, the Stop Ecocide Foundation. In November 2020, at the request of politicians from Sweden’s governing parties, the Foundation convened an Independent Expert Panel for the Legal Definition of Ecocide, co-chaired by Prof Sands and Senegalese jurist Dior Fall Sow. The purpose of this panel was to draft a proposed definition of ecocide that could be used as the basis for further campaigning efforts to effect its adoption by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and other relevant institutions.

Prof Sands explained that in carrying out this drafting work, the panel were inspired by the work of Hersch Lauterpacht and Raphael Lemkin and the adoption by the international community after World War II of three new international crimes, in addition to the classical ‘war crimes’. These were crimes against humanity, which sought to protect the rights of individuals; genocide, which sought to protect the rights of groups; and the crime of aggression, which sought to curb and penalise the waging of illegal war. To this day, these remain the only international crimes of pertinence to be introduced in the post-war period, and all are codified in the Rome Statute. It is to this list that campaigners now propose the crime of ecocide be added.

The full text of the definition that the Independent Expert Panel proposed can be found at page 5 of its Commentary and Core Text document, published in June 2021, but the core component is this:

For the purpose of this Statute, “ecocide” means unlawful or wanton acts committed with knowledge that there is a substantial likelihood of severe and either widespread or long-term damage to the environment being caused by those acts.

Prof Sands highlighted that, despite the similarity in the name, the definition is not based on genocide because the suggested crime of ecocide would not have the same intent. Environmental degradation, while often committed intentionally (or at the very least recklessly), is not an end goal in itself in the way that the systematic destruction of a national, ethnical, racial or religious group is the end goal of a person who commits genocide. Rather, the destruction of the natural environment occurs as a by-product of other choices, usually in the pursuit of specific economic and social ends. Thus, the drafters instead modelled their definition on that of crimes against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute.

The reason for the choice of nomenclature was rather simpler. When the Stop Ecocide Foundation carried out market research on the subject, they found that the public did not respond at all to the concept of ‘environmental crimes against humanity’, but had a much stronger and more instinctive response to the concept of ecocide, which the individuals polled almost universally agreed should be stopped.

Although they borrowed elements from the definition of crimes against humanity, the drafters wanted to come up with a non-anthropocentric definition of ecocide. Prof Sands stressed the legal significance of severing the link with humans in the definition, so that any potential future prosecutions under an amended Statute would not have to prove a causative link with harm to humans. On a more philosophical level, the definition reflects the notion that the natural world has some intrinsic and fundamental value, independent of its value to humanity.

There was a spirited debate about whether the definition should include a list of acts which would qualify as ecocide. In the end, a narrow majority favoured not including one, since lists in such a context tend to imply that anything not included is permissible, and this was not an impression that the drafters wished to create. Moreover, one could not realistically include a list of qualifying acts without including runaway climate change and to do so would be to place a huge political hurdle in the way of states signing up to support the concept, because it would create the impression introducing regulation to control their emissions by the back door. The consequence of adopting a definition without a list is that, were the proposed definition to be adopted by the ICC, it would be up to prosecutors to decide what acts to prosecute and judges to decide whether they qualify for conviction.

Prof Sands ended on a moderately optimistic note by highlighting that the concept of ecocide has been endorsed by the Secretary General of the UN, António Guterres, and Pope Francis. One of the committees in the Belgian Parliament has proposed to adopt a resolution in support of the adoption of the crime of ecocide and the full Parliament is expected to do so in the coming weeks. Prof Sands feels confident that there is momentum behind the concept which means that its adoption by the ICC is a matter of when, rather than if.

The second speaker was James Cameron, founder of FIELD (Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development). His talk moved beyond the text of the new proposed offence and considered its application in a wider context. He began by situating the ecocide campaign within the broader context of the youth climate movement, which has emerged partly in response to younger generations’ sense that current political and legal structures are inadequate to deal with the challenge at hand. He also noted that this movement uses the language of climate justice and made a plea for legal practitioners to think more creatively about how the law can be used to transformative effect.

Reflecting again on the early work of Polly Higgins on the issue of ecocide, he confessed to having been initially sceptical of a strategy which focused primarily on the ICC. He felt that a more productive approach would be to pursue existing rights arguments, especially those which argued environmental issues through the prism of human rights, through national courts and tribunals. Over time, however, he has come to view the concept more sympathetically as one potential way for the legal order to give expression to the most vulnerable pieces of the natural environment. He highlighted the parallel phenomenon of natural capital, more often discussed in the field of economics, as another potential way of giving institutional voice to a somewhat abstract idea, namely the protection of the natural world. He suggested that both natural capital and ecocide are fundamentally about creating rights in and for the environment for its own sake, beyond of its utility to humans.

Even though Mr Cameron has come around on the concept of ecocide as an addition to the ICC Statute, he still made a compelling case, first that radical concepts need to work through familiar structures, and second that ecocide could be more effectively embedded if it was able to operate through national as well international institutions. He suggested that trustees, ombudsmen, and advocates general could all help to ensure that there are people with procedural rights to pursue the issue in various tribunals, and counselled against putting all of the proverbial eggs in the basket of the ICC. He also argued that any campaign to add ecocide to the Statute of the ICC needs to think creatively about access to justice in this context and raised the question of whether there might be any scope for individuals to press charges under such a law.[2] While a new ecocide law would be significant and exciting step, it would still need to be viewed in the context of more general legal and non-legal advocacy on behalf of the environment. 

One theme which emerged across the webinar and the Q&A was the extent to which the problems which ecocide is designed to address stretch traditional notions of international law, which are geared towards relations between sovereign states. After all, it is not only, or even primarily, states which are responsible for the most egregious acts of environmental damage and degradation. One questioner asked whether corporations might potentially face prosecution by the ICC, but Prof Sands didn’t really see how corporate criminal responsibility could work in practice. The largest polluters can afford to pay almost any fine levelled at them and one cannot lock up a corporation.

Besides, international crimes are ultimately not committed by abstract governments or corporations but by individuals. This is as true for ecocide as it is for genocide, or crimes against humanity. Every active decision which results in catastrophic harm was made by someone. Thus, it was suggested by the speakers that the focus would have to be on prosecuting (and, if necessary, imprisoning) chief executives and politicians as individuals. Although the members of the Independent Expert Panel have all studiously avoided naming names, Pilita Clark, writing for the Financial Times, identified Brazilian President, Jair Bolsonaro, and ExxonMobil CEO, Darren Woods, as potential candidates. As outlandish as it might seem now, if the momentum keeps building behind the idea of ecocide, perhaps they might be the first of many.

What I have been watching this week…

After Sam’s lovely tribute to the joys of Advent last week I must admit that I have not been consuming anything nearly as highbrow as César Franck’s violin sonata recently. Instead I have been indulging in a bit of timey-wimey escapism and very much enjoying the current series of Doctor Who, which has been a slightly silly delight for the past few weeks, as the days have grown chillier and the evenings darker.


[1] The word derives from the Greek oikos, meaning home, and the Latin caedere, meaning demolish or kill. Thus, a rough translation (though not technically a correct etymology, since the word was a modern coinage) is “to kill one’s home”.

[2] The webinar did not include a discussion of the Aarhus Convention as a potential model and/or point of comparison for such participation and procedural rights but, as Sam pointed out to me, it certainly seems to offer some interesting parallels.

Planning to Level Up  

Last month Tewkesbury Borough Council lost their challenge against the decision by a planning inspector to grant permission for 50 homes at Gotherington, after an appeal by developers JJ Gallagher and Richard Cook against the local authority’s initial refusal of permission. Under paragraph 74 of the National Planning Policy Framework (July 2021 version), a local planning authority is required to maintain a five-year supply of deliverable housing sites, designed to meet its local housing requirement calculations. Paragraph 11 establishes that, where a local authority has failed to maintain such a land supply, the so-called “presumption in favour of sustainable development” applies and planning permission should usually be granted.

The central issue in Tewkesbury Borough Council v Secretary of State for Housing Communities And Local Government [2021] EWHC 2782 (Admin) was whether a local authority which had previously delivered more homes than its own average annual delivery target suggested were needed during the earlier part of its Local Plan period was: a) entitled; and b) required to factor that past oversupply into its future housing land supply calculations. The council claimed that, when past delivery across the plan period was taken into account, they had a land supply of 4.37 years, but the inspector disagreed, estimating that the local authority had just 1.82 years’ supply and consequently applying the presumption in favour of sustainable development and approving the Gotherington application.  

The council appealed, and the High Court was therefore required to consider a question upon which the NPPF and Planning Practice Guidance on Housing Supply and Delivery are both silent, namely how authorities should treat past oversupply. The Court upheld the inspector’s decision in this instance, but before hard-pressed local planning authorities throw up their hands in despair, they should turn to the judgment of Mr Justice Dove. Although Dove J was clear in his rejection of the claimant local authority’s contention that they were required by law to factor past oversupply into their future housing land supply calculations [42], he did not go so far as to state that it could never be a relevant consideration. Rather, he held that “the question of whether or not to take into account past oversupply in the circumstances of the present case is, like the question of how it is to be taken into account, a question of planning judgment which is not addressed by the Framework or the PPG and for which therefore there is no policy” [47]. It will therefore be for local authorities and inspectors to consider the relevance of previous housing delivery levels to current local planning policies, applications and appeals on a case by case basis, doubtless creating plenty of work for planning barristers in the process.

The nave of Tewkesbury Abbey

This judgment does result in considerable ongoing uncertainty. However, one can see why Dove J declined to offer a rigid legal precedent on this issue, holding that it would be inappropriate “to introduce, by way of inference, text into the policy of the Framework which does not exist” [45]. The interpretation of planning policy will always be contingent upon local circumstances and the application of an overly legalistic blanket approach to decision-making will rarely be appropriate. Moreover, the imposition by the Court of a mandatory rule one way or the other on this issue might have had a deleterious effect on the ability of local authorities to meet housing need in their area. If councils were never allowed to factor any past delivery into their future housing land supply calculations, it might create a perverse incentive for some authorities which would otherwise be proactive about promoting development to meet local need, to delay the allocation of land for housing, the granting of planning permission, and potentially the supply of social housing until later in the plan period, to maintain their rolling housing land supply. Conversely, if authorities were always required to take past oversupply into account, this could potentially put an unnecessary constraint on their delivery ambitions. In either case, it would be deeply unfortunate if an overly prescriptive approach to paragraph 73 of the NPPF were to prevent local authorities from housing people on their waiting lists.

Also raising important questions about the relationship between past delivery and future housing need in the last couple of weeks was the first report of the Building Back Britain Commission, entitled ‘Levelling up and the housing challenge‘. Established by six commissioners from organisations across the housing and construction sectors, this Commission has suggested that the Government’s methodology for calculating housing need requires a radical overhaul if the levelling up agenda is to be achieved.  

The standard methodology for calculating “objectively assessed need” (OAN) for housing, as set out in the PPG on Housing and Economic Needs Assessment has four stages:

  1. First, local planning authorities are required to set a baseline figure according to household growth projections for their area.
  2. Second, they adjust that figure according to the local housing affordability ratio, so that areas with the biggest gap between earnings and house prices are required to deliver the most homes.
  3. Third, an authority may cap the upwards adjustment of its housing need figure, provided that it has up to date strategic policies in place, including any relevant policies contained in a spatial development strategy.
  4. Fourth and finally, in the twenty most populated urban centres in England a further 35% uplift is applied after the cap in Stage 3.

This methodology was first introduced in the 2018 revision of the NPPF, at which point it comprised only stages 1–3. The Government has since attempted to tweak the method to bring it into line with its national ambition to deliver 300,000 homes per year. (One might question whether a methodology designed to result in a predetermined figure can really be said to be measuring housing need at all, but that is an argument for another post!) The first proposal from what is now called the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (formerly MHCLG) was to place an even greater emphasis on local affordability indices to determine the uplift required after initial household projections were calculated, but this was extremely controversial and faced a great deal of backlash, including from Conservative backbenchers. Eventually the Government abandoned this approach and adopted the new “top ups” for large urban centres instead, fixing on the 35% level to bring the overall figure into line with the 300,000 homes per year goal.

This adjustment brought the numbers up on a national level but did nothing to address one of the underlying issues with the current methodology, namely that it produces local housing need calculations which are higher in areas where the market is already overheated and lower in areas where it is depressed. Planning policies based on these calculations will inherently reinforce market forces rather than doing anything to proactively shape the housing market or rebalance the economy away from the South East and from major urban centres and towards other regions of England and smaller cities and towns. At present, for example, the OAN standard methodology leaves councils in the London commuter belt attempting to meet ever more ambitious housing targets, within the constraints imposed by Green Belt and AONB designations, while many post-industrial towns in other parts of the country are deemed to need far fewer new homes, despite having a good deal of brownfield land which would be ripe for redevelopment.

Planning policy could be a powerful tool in the Government’s armoury as it pursues its levelling up agenda. The opportunity is there, especially with regards to brownfield sites. In the latest of its series of reports on the subject, published in October of last year, CPRE calculated that there are currently enough sites on local authority brownfield registers to build 1.3 million new homes, of which 53% already have planning permission. A large proportion of these sites are in the North and Midlands, and in smaller urban centres as well as major cities. The Building Back Britain report recognised this opportunity and called for a new national housing strategy, which would be explicitly aligned to the levelling up agenda. Rather than calculating housing need on the basis of historic growth, this strategy would proactively identify more deprived areas of the country which would benefit most from future investment in housing. It would also involve explicit targets for the delivery of affordable homes and the greater implementation of ‘Modern Methods of Construction’ (MMC), to speed up housing delivery and reduce its environmental impact relative to traditional construction.

A post-Covid world seems like an ideal time to put some of these ideas into practice. As Sam highlighted in his post last week, more of us than ever before are now working from home on a full- or part-time basis, and with the increased possibilities allowed by remote working, smaller towns in less well-connected areas of the country might seem like increasingly attractive places to live. The Government should seize this moment, while the agglomerative forces binding large portions of the workforce to major cities and to London in particular are at their weakest in a generation, to promote a truly transformative planning agenda, which directs investment to where it is most needed rather than following the market.

There have been some signs that developments on this front might be in the pipeline. Appearing on the 2nd November before the House of Lords’ Built Environment Committee, Housing Minister Christopher Pincher told members of the committee to “watch this space” on the possibility of the Government introducing new methods of land value capture to encourage and support local authorities to start building homes again [p. 18]. Meanwhile, Planning Resource magazine ran an article on 5th November reporting that the Building Back Britain Commission proposals for a national housing strategy has been backed by Secretary of State Michael Gove.

It is always as well with proposed planning changes not to get ahead of oneself. The last few years have seen a wide variety of proposed alterations and overhauls to the NPPF make it to the consultation stage only to be abandoned. But right now there does seem to be a window of opportunity for the government to introduce a more equitable method of calculating housing need, which would help direct public and private investment towards areas which are most in need of it. As the Tewkesbury judgment shows, it is not enough to rely on past delivery statistics. There is now authority for the fact that these cannot serve as an excuse for future under-delivery on a local level. Neither should they be used to predict and direct future policy for housing delivery on a national scale. As we emerge from the pandemic, it is time for  a more interventionist approach to planning, informed by a genuine levelling up agenda. The Government should remember the old adage and know that if they build it, we will come.    

What I’ve been up to recently…

I was very happy to have the opportunity be one of the judges for the first round of the City Law School GDL moot recently. A year ago, the first round of the 2020/21 competition was my first ever experience of mooting and an excellent way to get more comfortable with the process before tackling any external competitions. So it was really nice to come full circle and have the chance to offer some advice to students just starting out on their GDL adventures.

1066 and All That: The role of bishops in the courts after the Norman Conquest

The decades after the Norman Conquest of England in 1066 were a time of tremendous political and administrative upheaval, which saw the transformation of many Anglo-Saxon institutions, including the church and, to a lesser extent, the courts. In consolidating his rule over an unfamiliar kingdom, whose language he did not speak, William the Conqueror relied heavily on his bishops. Initially content to allow incumbent bishops to continue in post, in 1070 William changed strategy and deposed five bishops who had especially close ties to powerful pre-Conquest families. These he replaced with men from the continent, several of whom had already served as chaplains in the royal chapel. During the rest of his reign, William continued to appoint bishops who had been educated at prestigious cathedral schools on the continent before serving for a period in the royal chapel.   

By the time of his death in 1087, the king had assembled an impressive episcopal bench in England, full of men of proven loyalty and exceptional administrative abilities. The Conqueror’s bishops played a crucial role in the establishment of the new Anglo-Norman regime, as did two bishops of Norman dioceses — the king’s half-brother Odo of Bayeux (at least until his imprisonment in 1082 or 1083) and Geoffrey, bishop of Coutances. They served the king as royal justices and administrators, tutored his children, led military expeditions on his behalf, and played an important part both in the coordination of the Domesday survey of 1086 and in the effective functioning of the legal system of the day, through their role presiding over meetings of the shire court. It is this last responsibility which forms the main subject of this piece.[1]

Scene from the Bayeux Tapestry in which Bishop Odo blesses the first meal that William the Conqueror and the Norman barons ate on English soil

William I inherited a kingdom in which the shire was already established as the standard territorial subdivision for administrative and fiscal purposes, except in the far North. Its court was of fundamental importance in local government. The principle that the shire court should meet twice a year was enshrined in the mid-tenth century in the Andover law code of King Edgar, which also specified that the bishop and the ealdorman of the shire should preside over the assembly, as representatives of sacred and secular law respectively. This code also decreed that no one should take a plea to the king unless his own lord had refused, or been unable, to do right by him. This provision was expanded during the reign of King Cnut, whose surviving law code stipulated that a man might not take his plea to the shire court until he had demanded justice three times in the hundred court, and must never take any dispute to the king’s court which could be resolved in a lower court. Even in the tenth and eleventh centuries it would seem that there were concerns about the higher courts being overwhelmed by frivolous challenges.

Although pre-Conquest law codes suggest that an apparent hierarchy of courts already existed in England by the mid-eleventh century, in practice it might not always have been readily apparent where a case ought to be resolved. This potential ambiguity can be observed in legal historian Patrick Wormald’s discussion of a dispute in 990 between a nobleman, Leofwine, and a noblewoman, Wynflæd, over lands in Berkshire.[2] In this instance, Wynflæd wished to take her case directly to the king but Leofwine insisted upon it being heard in the shire court of Berkshire. Eventually the shire court was convened to hear the plea, Bishops Æthelsige of Sherborne and Æscwig of Dorchester presided, the king sent his seal with the abbot of Bath, and Wynflæd ultimately won. The case illustrates the successful functioning of an Anglo-Saxon shire court, but also how, despite the promulgation of royal law codes, there might still be some confusion as to whether it was the correct forum for certain disputes to be aired. It is also striking that the account of this plea records two bishops presiding alone, without a secular lord alongside them.

The shire court in this period performed a wide variety of judicial and social functions. It was a forum for litigation, certainly, but also a place where arrangements were made for the collection of taxes, where men might be outlawed, where business transactions might occur, or marriages be arranged. It was thus in the interests of every landholder, great or small, to be in attendance at the court, or at least to make sure he (or more infrequently she) was represented there.

Despite the centrality of the shire court to Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman government in the localities, however, it is difficult to obtain a complete picture of how the institution functioned in practice during the turbulent years after 1066. Two possible facets of its operation are presented in contrasting, but not incompatible, reconstructions by Richard Sharpe and Nicholas Karn. In his pioneering 2003 article on ‘The Use of Writs in the Eleventh Century’, Sharpe gave a clear account of how a type of document known as a writ-charter might have been requested and obtained by a beneficiary, delivered to the shire court and there read aloud to the assembled company, before being returned to the beneficiary, who could choose whether to retain the document.[3] The process Sharpe envisaged was a sophisticated and systematic one, initiated at the request of beneficiaries but firmly controlled and directed by royal government at the centre. Karn, by contrast, presented shire courts as potentially chaotic forums which ‘were not designed for the efficient processing of business sent to them from on high, but rather seem often to have found decision-making difficult. Their importance does not derive from their usefulness to kings, as a means of imposing policy and decisions, but from their usefulness in debate.’[4]

It is possible to reconcile these interpretations to some extent. We may accept that kings had a sophisticated administrative mechanism at their disposal, in the shape of writs and writ-charters, while also recognising that the institutions to which documents were directed might sometimes have operated in a rather unruly fashion. It is also probable that a good deal of routine business was carried out smoothly and uneventfully in local assemblies but has left no trace in narrative accounts and documentary archives concerned with recording and preserving the exceptional. Nevertheless, the tension between the two readings may reflect an actual tension in the shire courts of the eleventh century, between the governmental objectives of the king on the one hand and political circumstances on the ground in the localities on the other.

The Conqueror’s reign was an important period in the development of the shire court, with the loss of many of the earldoms which had characterised the political geography of pre-Conquest England. From the middle of the tenth century until the reign of Edward the Confessor, bishops and ealdormen or earls had habitually presided over the court together. The old Anglo-Saxon earldoms did not disappear entirely after the Conquest, nor were all of their English incumbents immediately removed. Nevertheless, English earldoms diminished in number and altered in nature over the ensuing decades. No longer was every county and every shire court necessarily presided over by an earl, as they had been during Edward the Confessor’s reign.

Where earls vanished, however, bishops continued to appear, presiding over meetings of the shire court long after their secular counterparts had ceased to do so. They occur occasionally in narrative accounts of shire court proceedings but most of the evidence for their involvement comes from contemporary royal writs. These were short documents in epistolary form, authenticated by the king’s seal and usually contained some kind of notification or injunction for the recipient. Or they might be writ-charters, which took a similar form but conferred land or rights on their beneficiary. Because these documents took the form of letters, and most historians agree they were intended to be read out in the shire court, their address clauses provide useful clues as to which officials usually presided over meetings of the court.

The origins of the writ in England may lie as far back as the ninth century. They were certainly in habitual use by Anglo-Saxon kings by the late tenth century, alongside longer and more formal documents known as ‘diplomas’, although the earliest surviving examples date from the reign of Cnut in the early eleventh century. The reign of Edward the Confessor saw the proliferation of writs, which quickly supplanted the more unwieldy diplomas. After 1066 diplomas to English beneficiaries all but disappeared. By contrast, the writ flourished and performed an increasing range of functions. A number of supposed writs of William I are in fact forgeries dating from the mid twelfth century onwards, mostly from the abbeys of Westminster and Battle. The eagerness of twelfth-century forgers to produce counterfeit royal writs, as well as spurious diplomas, demonstrates that writs were considered important enough to be worth forging.

David Bates’ edition of the charters of William I, Regesta Regum Anglo-Normannorum, contains 171 writs or writ-charters, of which thirty-one are outright forgeries.[5] During my PhD research I analysed these writs for the individuals or groups to whom they were addressed and their language of composition. The main impression which emerged was one of variation, with practices far from standardised. Groups and individuals in late-eleventh-century landed society appear in a wide variety of combinations and sometimes it is difficult to identify for certain the office which a particular addressee held. For example, Gamel, son of Osbeorht, appears alongside Earl Morcar in a writ of 1067 × 1069 granting land to Beverley Minster in Yorkshire. His appearance in this context suggests that Gamel was probably the sheriff of Yorkshire at this date but this writ is the only evidence that he ever occupied the office.

Variation and occasional uncertainty notwithstanding, it is possible to gain a general sense of what proportion of the surviving writs of William the Conqueror featured different kinds of people. Of all the office holders addressed in these documents, bishops appear in the greatest numbers. Ninety of the 140 writs which are certainly or potentially authentic include a bishop or bishops among their addressees, a proportion of 64.3% or a little under two-thirds. Sheriffs are the second most prolific group, with eighty-four appearances. Earls appear thirty-seven times, and two early writs, in favour of the abbeys of Bath and Westminster, include a type of Anglo-Saxon official known as a ‘staller’ among their addressees, apparently taking the place of the earl.

Bishops, then, appear in a majority of extant writs of William I, though by no means in all. Several factors may have affected the likelihood of a bishop being among the addressees of any given writ. In some cases, he may have been omitted from a document because it detailed a grant, or the outcome of a plea, which ran contrary to episcopal interests and which the bishop in question might therefore have wished to obstruct. Such may be the case in a writ of 1081, addressed to Roger Bigod, the sheriff of Norfolk, notifying him of the resolution of the long running dispute between the local bishop, Herfast of Thetford, and the abbot of Bury St Edmunds. The king informed the sheriff that he and his leading magnates had heard the case and decided in favour of Abbot Baldwin, and ordered that the bishop should make no further claims upon the church of St Edmund. Bishop Herfast must have been informed of the outcome of this plea, if indeed he was not present when the decision was made, but in the context of a protracted and acrimonious dispute such as this one, it makes sense that the sheriff alone should be addressed and that the king should charge him, as a neutral party and royal representative, with enforcing the outcome.

On the other hand, there are those documents where the bishop himself, or his cathedral church, was the beneficiary. This did not necessarily preclude him from also being an addressee, but it did make it less likely. Forty authentic or potentially authentic writs in favour of episcopal beneficiaries survive, of which just over half include a bishop among their addressees (lower than the two-thirds figure for the total corpus). Of the twenty-one writs where bishops do appear, six are addressed to the beneficiary bishop, seven more generally to ‘episcopis’ or ‘archiepiscopis’, four to the bishop of the diocese where the land being granted was located, and a final four to a named bishop who is neither the beneficiary nor the diocesan for the shire in which the grant was made.

Of these categories it is perhaps the last group which is most interesting, demonstrating as it does the part that might be played by bishops in the local politics and administration of areas beyond the boundaries of their own dioceses. Two of these writs are addressed to Archbishop Lanfranc and indeed it makes sense that a writ might be directed to the archdiocesan bishop in cases where the diocesan bishop was either the beneficiary of a grant or involved in a dispute in need of resolution. However, two other writs demonstrate that, in exceptional circumstances, ordinary diocesan bishops might be addressed about business which had nothing to do with their own dioceses. Both are connected with that most extraordinary of events: the Domesday survey.

One is a writ issued by Bishop Geoffrey of Coutances, acting in a vice-regal capacity, and addressed to Remigius, bishop of Lincoln, and several other nobles, informing them of the outcome of a dispute between the bishop of Worcester and the abbot of Evesham. This writ is undoubtedly connected with the role of these men as Domesday commissioners in the West Midlands, which is recorded in a late-eleventh century account of a Worcestershire Domesday session by a monk from Worcester cathedral named Hemming. The function of this document was not to effect a grant or settlement in itself, but to provide the commissioners with information which was of use to them in the performance of their commission. Hemming makes it clear that it was not directed to a routine meeting of the shire court but to an extraordinary assembly which occurred at the time ‘when the king ordered the whole of England to be described’.

A second writ dealing with the grant of Bishop’s Stortford castle to Bishop Maurice of London is addressed to Bishop Osmund of Salisbury and the sheriffs of Oxfordshire and Essex. This grant must have been made after Maurice’s appointment as bishop at Christmas 1085 and presumably before King William’s departure for France in the autumn of 1086. Great Domesday Book tells us that Maurice held land at Stortford but makes no mention of the castle. It is therefore possible that the grant was made some time during 1086, after the first stage of the survey was completed. Unlike the Worcestershire example, it does not seem to be explicitly connected with the Domesday survey.

The language of the writ is Old English rather than Latin, even some fifteen years after King William had adopted Latin as the normal language of written communication with his key officials. However, there is considerable evidence that the shire courts were still operating in English some forty years after the Conquest. This may, therefore, be a rare surviving example of a once numerous body of Old English writs, which continued to be issued to shire courts after the apparent 1070 transition to Latin as the language of central government.

If this is to be interpreted as a writ designed to be read in the shire court, however, it raises questions about which shire is being addressed, and why Bishop Osmund should appear to have presided over an assembly which must have occurred outside his own diocese and was not explicitly part of the Domesday survey. Is it possible that, as a consequence of the unavoidable upheaval that the survey must have caused, and the forced itinerancy of some of the most important men in the country, shire court meetings during the first half of 1086 might have been presided over by whichever ecclesiastical or secular magnates happened to be on hand, so as to avoid an eleventh-century court backlog?

This flexibility regarding who William entrusted to preside over local courts is further reflected in the number of his surviving writs which are addressed to some combination of Archbishop Lanfranc, Geoffrey of Coutances and, less frequently, Odo of Bayeux and Robert, count of Mortain. This select group of men were William’s closest advisors and most capable administrators. At least until the disgrace and imprisonment of Odo in 1082 or 1083, each of them stood right at the heart of the king’s council. Two, Odo and Robert, were his half-brothers. Three were bishops, though only one presided over an English diocese. At different times both Odo and Geoffrey issued writs on behalf of the king, acting in an effectively vice-regal capacity.

William seems to have employed this ‘task force’ of powerful and experienced men in situations which were too urgent, complex or delicate to be resolved through the usual channels of local government. Such is the case in a series of writs in favour of the abbey of Ely, addressed variously to Lanfranc, Geoffrey of Coutances and Robert of Mortain and datable to 1081 × 1087, during which period the abbey was in a customs dispute with Bishop Remigius of Lincoln. Sometimes members of the ‘task force’ were explicitly charged with resolving disputes over jurisdiction between bishops and neighbouring abbeys, as in a Worcester writ of 1078 × 1085 demanding that Lanfranc and Geoffrey settle a disagreement between Bishop Wulfstan of Worcester and Abbot Walter of Evesham and specifying that Geoffrey should preside in place of the king. In other cases, there are writs which do not directly address a dispute but still refer to circumstances which have arisen because of it, such as an instruction that the abbey of Ely should be allowed to take repossession of various lands in Cambridgeshire, Suffolk and Essex.

William issued an increasing number of these ‘task force’ writs during the later years of his reign, a fact which might seem to support Nicholas Karn’s suggestion that the shire court was rather an unwieldy forum for resolving disputes, structured as it was to facilitate debate more than decision. It may have become increasingly apparent to the king that the shire courts, so well adapted to the routine business of eleventh-century government, were not fully equipped to deal with some of the more protracted and complex disputes which arose in the turbulent years after the Conquest. It is a testament both to William’s political judgement and to the flexibility and utility of the writ as an instrument of royal government, that he was able to counter extraordinary circumstances with specific instructions to some of his most powerful and competent men.

Does it necessarily follow that the individuals addressed in a writ were actually present at the shire court to hear it read out? It is true that bishops are the most frequently addressed group of people in the surviving writs of William I. Yet even in cases where the subject of a writ was a straightforward grant of property or privileges, the addressees did not always include the bishop/s for the shire, or shires, where the property was situated.

Sometimes, for example, when the beneficiary institution and the property being granted were in separate shires, writs seem to have been addressed to the relevant archbishop, as though the matter had been referred higher up the ecclesiastical hierarchy. A general confirmation of all the lands and customs of St Mary’s of Abingdon, probably issued shortly after the accession of Abbot Adelelm in 1071, was addressed to Archbishop Lanfranc and the relevant sheriffs for the shires where the abbey held land – that is Berkshire, Oxfordshire, Warwickshire and Gloucestershire. At this time Berkshire was part of the diocese of Salisbury, Oxfordshire part of the diocese of Lincoln, Gloucestershire split between the dioceses of Worcester and Hereford (though mostly in Worcester), and Warwickshire between the dioceses of Worcester and Lichfield. The abbey, then, held land in many different dioceses and it makes sense that this confirmation of its possessions should be addressed to the archdiocesan, rather than to each of the diocesan bishops in question.

However, the anonymous author of the abbey chronicle provided an account of this writ being read out in the shire court of Berkshire and this raises questions about the purpose of the writ and the reasons for the identity of the addressees. Was this a routine or an extraordinary meeting of the shire court of Berkshire, and did Archbishop Lanfranc actually preside over it in person? Was the writ also read in other shire courts? If so, why did the Abingdon chronicler only mention Berkshire? Lanfranc himself was also omitted from the account of the writ being read at the shire court. These questions remain unanswered, and perhaps unanswerable in this instance, but they are a salutary reminder that the presence of an individual in the address clause of a writ is not a guarantee of his presence in the shire court at its reading.

Bishops were busy men, with many competing demands on their time. It is highly likely that, the address clauses of writs notwithstanding, they were sometimes unable to attend meetings of the shire court and that their places were taken by deputies. This was also the period during which archdeaconries began to be established on a significant scale, including the earliest territorial archdeaconries, with archdeacons assisting bishops in a variety of spiritual and pastoral duties. By the time of Bishop Remigius’ death in 1092, the vast diocese of Lincoln had seven territorial archdeaconries, each of which corresponded with a particular shire: Lincoln, Huntingdon, Northampton, Leicester, Oxford, Buckingham and Bedford. While I was able to find no specific references in contemporary sources to an archdeacon presiding over the shire court in place of a bishop, it seems highly likely that they did sometimes deputise for bishops in secular as well as ecclesiastical affairs, especially in cases where the boundaries of an archdeaconry corresponded with the boundaries of a shire. It is possible therefore that some of the surviving writs addressed to diocesan bishops were actually delivered to assemblies at which they were not present, and where their place was taken by a deputy, perhaps an archdeacon.

Nevertheless, the different types of writ that continued to coexist throughout the Conqueror’s reign indicate a legal and administrative system built on solid and lasting foundations, but which was also responsive to the political needs of the moment. Traditional practices obviously continued, and probably more widely than surviving documents would suggest. The Old English writ concerning the grant of Stortford castle to Maurice of London was clearly directed towards some kind of assembly operating in the vernacular, despite the fact that the three named addressees were all Normans. It seems almost certain that more vernacular documents like the Stortford writ have been lost and that the surviving impression of Anglo-Norman administration is therefore skewed towards new and innovative forms and practices, at the expense of older and more conservative ones.

The Conqueror, meanwhile, seems to have been prepared to rely on existing structures where they were useful to him, and to devise alternative systems where traditional ones failed. The shire court system, and the simplicity and flexibility of the royal writ as an instrument of government, offered the English king a direct channel of communication with the localities, of a kind which was unparalleled in contemporary Europe, while his network of trusted bishops provided him with a competent and well-educated civil service of sorts. Moreover, unlike secular magnates, bishops left no legitimate heirs and had no independent power base derived from hereditary lands, and the king could ultimately appoint their successors to further cement his power in the provinces. More than any of his continental contemporaries, King William looked to his bishops to help him navigate the political and administrative challenges of consolidating his rule over a foreign and sometimes hostile kingdom. The Conqueror’s bishops played a profound role in almost every aspect of the law and government of England.


[1] A more detailed and fully-referenced discussion of this subject can be found in Chapter 2 of my PhD thesis, Clerks and Commissioners: The Role of Bishops in the Government of England, c.1050–1087 (Unpublished PhD Thesis, King’s College London, December 2017).

[2] Patrick Wormald, The Making of English Law: King Alfred to the Twelfth Century, Volume I: Legislation and its Limits (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 151–2.

[3] Richard Sharpe, ‘The use of writs in the eleventh century’, Anglo-Saxon England, 32 (2003), 247–91, pp. 251–3.

[4] Nicholas Karn, ‘Centralism and local government in medieval England: constitutional history and assembly politics, 950-1300’, History Compass, 10 (2012), 742–51, p. 747.

[5] David Bates, ed., ‘Regesta Regum Anglo-Normannorum’: The Acta of William I (1066–1087) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

A canary in the coal mine? Why the UK legal system is ill-equipped to deal with the climate crisis

I grew up on the west coast of Cumbria, about two miles north of Sellafield nuclear reprocessing plant and eight miles south of the former mining community and port town of Whitehaven. Further up the coast near Workington, onshore wind turbines overlook the fascinatingly alien landscape of the Workington slag banks, formed from the by-products of pig iron production by the Workington Haematite Iron Company during the second half of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century. On a clear day, you can also see the larger offshore turbines of the Robin Rigg windfarm out in the Solway Firth.

Steel production ceased in West Cumbria in 1974 and the county’s last deep coal mine, the Haig Pit at Whitehaven, closed in 1986, but the landscape still provides an insight into the area’s industrial heritage. It also offers a clear indication as to what now sustains the economy of many of the coastal communities between Silloth and Barrow-in-Furness — the energy and especially the nuclear sector. In 2008, a public-private partnership called ‘Britain’s Energy Coast’ (since renamed ‘Building Extraordinary Communities’) launched its masterplan for the West Cumbrian economy, designed to show how it could be put on a sustainable footing by 2027 through investment in new nuclear power plants and renewable energy projects.

The view of Sellafield from Nethertown railway bridge
Workington wind turbines
Workington slag banks. The unusual shape of the rock is due to the giant ladle that was used to dump molten slag off the banks above.

But thirteen years later very little of what appeared in the masterplan has come to pass. The area’s economy is still extremely reliant on Sellafield, with research by Oxford Economics in 2017 suggesting that close to 60% of all jobs in the borough of Copeland are in some way dependent on the nuclear site [p. 21], and instead of major new renewable energy schemes generating jobs and economic growth we have the controversial Woodhouse Colliery proposal. If it goes ahead, this colliery near Whitehaven will be the UK’s first new deep coal mine in thirty years.

The company behind the project, West Cumbria Mining (WCM), started developing its plans for the extraction and processing of metallurgical (or coking) coal in 2014. The company claims that the mine would create 530 permanent jobs, of which 80% would go to local people. More controversially, it argues that it would be a ‘net zero’ emissions development, which would achieve compliance with the UK’s legally binding climate commitments via offsetting residual emissions with carbon credits certified by the Gold Standard Foundation.

It is easy to see why the prospect of a major new employer in area, creating hundreds of jobs, might seem appealing. Although wages at Sellafield are high, West Cumbria overall has faced sustained economic decline over several decades. Its working-age population is shrinking. An ever-increasing number of shops in Whitehaven town centre are shuttered up. The area is badly in need of some of the ‘levelling up’ promised by the Government.

In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that the proposal was previously approved by Cumbria County Council on three separate occasions. However, in February this year the council announced that it would be reconsidering the application for a fourth time. A month later, having previously declined to intervene, then Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government Robert Jenrick announced that he would be calling the application in for a public inquiry after all, citing new recommendations by the Government’s Committee on Climate Change as the rationale for the U-turn.

The inquiry opened on 7 September 2021 and ran for four weeks. The applicant, WCM, and Rule 6 Parties, local campaign group South Lakes Action on Climate Change (SLACC) and Friends of the Earth, appeared and were represented by counsel. Cumbria County Council did not take part in the proceedings, having decided to adopt a neutral stance on the application. Especially keen readers can find the recordings of all the sessions on the Planning Inspectorate YouTube channel.

Before being called in, the proposed development had already been subject to legal challenges on both sides of the debate. A judicial review application against the County Council’s approval of a previous version of the proposal by campaign group Keep Cumbrian Coal in the Hole received permission in February 2020, before proceedings were curtailed when WCM submitted a revised planning application. Earlier this year, the mining company itself announced that it would seek to challenge the County Council’s decision to reconsider the proposal for a fourth time, but the Secretary of State announced a public inquiry before the matter could reach the permission stage.

The entire process to date has served to highlight yet again the extent to which our legal and planning systems struggle to fully assess the climate impacts of proposed developments. Despite the UK’s legally binding obligation under s.1(1) of the Climate Change Act 2008 to reach net zero emissions by 2050 and the obligation on the Secretary of State to set regular carbon budgets (s.4, CCA 2008), the Act is not prescriptive about the actions that the Government or other relevant decision-makers must take to achieve these obligations.

The courts have also tended to be hesitant about pushing back too hard against decisions to approve individual carbon-intensive infrastructure projects. In a recent interview with The Planner magazine, barrister Estelle Dehon, who frequently acts on behalf of environmental campaign groups, suggested that this hesitation might be due in part to a political environment shaped by “many years of politicians… telling the courts ‘If you go too far, you will be knocked back. If you take liberties, we will act to ensure that you can’t do that any more. If you criticise too closely, we’ll clip your wings’.”

Finally, it is difficult to draw precise causal links between specific proposals under challenge and the vast global impact of the climate crisis. Indeed, a recent paper by researchers at the University of Oxford found that the claimants in 73% of cases surveyed across 14 jurisdictions did not even try, failing to cite any peer-reviewed evidence in their submissions. All these factors feed into an environment which makes it hard for legal challenges around climate change to succeed.

In the UK in the last two years, a number of high-profile challenges to emissions-heavy developments have been dismissed. In R (on the application of Finch) v Surrey County Council [2020] EWHC 3566 (Admin), [2021] PTSR 1160, concerning the grant of planning permission for the drilling of four new oil wells in Surrey, the High Court held that a developer’s obligation under the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2017 to provide an environmental statement describing the likely direct and indirect impacts of a development did not extend to assessing the greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the use of an end-product originating from that development. In R (on the application of ClientEarth) v Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy [2021] EWCA Civ 43, [2021] PTSR 1400, the Court of Appeal held that then Secretary of State Andrea Leadsom had carried out the balancing exercise under s.104(7) Planning Act 2008 correctly and was entitled to conclude that the benefits of the proposed new gas-fired Drax Power Station outweighed the environmental costs [108–109].

Finally, in R (on the application of Friends of the Earth and others) v Heathrow Airport Ltd [2020] UKSC 52, [2021] PTSR 190, the Supreme Court overturned the judgment of the Court of Appeal that the Government’s Airports National Policy Statement was unlawful on climate change grounds. The Court of Appeal had held that the ANPS failed to satisfy the obligation under s.5(8) of the Planning Act 2008 to “include an explanation of how the policy set out in the statement takes account of Government policy relating to the mitigation of, and adaptation to, climate change”. It defined ‘Government policy’ as being both the UK’s ratification of the Paris Agreement and subsequent statements by ministers Andrea Leadsom and Amber Rudd (Plan B Earth v Secretary of State for Transport [2020] EWCA Civ 214, [2020] PTSR 1446 at [228]). The Supreme Court dismissed these oral statements as being insufficiently clearly formulated to constitute Government policy and held that it would be unreasonable to expect civil servants to “trawl through Hansard and press statements” to identify policies [105]. One might question why the Court did not consider the Paris Agreement itself to constitute Government policy, since ratified international agreements form a clearly defined and readily identifiable list. Given the rather general wording of the agreement, however, it might not have made a difference to the outcome of the case even if the Court had held that it was Government policy to adhere to it.

The cases cited above are not an exhaustive list. Other challenges to the construction of HS2 and the design of the new UK Emissions Trading Scheme have also failed on broadly similar grounds, namely the wide margin of appreciation enjoyed by decision-makers when it comes to translating the UK’s legally binding emissions reduction targets into actual policy. This degree of discretion, coupled with the growing weight of adverse precedent, means that climate campaigners seeking to bring public law challenges against Government policy are facing an uphill battle.

Indeed, the outcomes of these cases beg the question of whether legally binding climate targets are actually enforceable in any meaningful sense. At a national level, the Committee on Climate Change calculates that the UK is not on track to meet its fourth or fifth carbon budgets, and there is an overwhelming scientific consensus that we are headed for catastrophic warming without drastic emissions reductions in the next decade, let alone by 2050. Yet on a case by case basis, it always seems possible for a decision-maker, company or industry body to argue that the emissions from a specific carbon-intensive infrastructure project will be offset by emissions reductions in other sectors of the economy and/or that the socio-economic benefits of a proposal outweigh its negative environmental impacts.

Thus, judicial review challenges brought against the lawfulness of such decisions are likely to keep failing, because of the near impossibility of proving that a particular project in isolation will prevent the UK from meeting its emissions reduction targets. Irrationality challenges seem even less likely to succeed, since the bar for such challenges is set so high (although if one asked an 18-year-old whether they thought it was rational to be constructing new coal mines, oil wells, runways or gas-fired power stations in the 2020s, one suspects they might give a rather different answer from a judge).[1]

Fortunately for campaigners against the Cumbria coal mine, the planning system offers more flexibility about how climate impacts are included in the decision-making process than the legal system does, in part because planning decisions are more explicitly informed by political considerations than legal decisions are. For example, as Estelle Dehon, acting for SLACC, submitted in her closing statement to the inquiry on 1 October 2021, the judgment in Finch v Surrey County Council relates only to whether end-use emissions must be factored in when determining the legality of an Environmental Impact Assessment. It is not authority for the proposition that such emissions cannot be a material planning consideration. In the case of a coal mine, end-use emissions are necessarily fundamental in determining the overall climate impacts of the proposed development.

The inquiry spent its first week dealing with the potential economic benefits of the scheme, its second focussing on the need for coking coal in UK and EU steelmaking, and its third considering the impact of the scheme on carbon-dioxide and methane emissions. The Rule 6 Parties lead a range expert witnesses, whose evidence challenged WCM’s assertion that the project was compatible with the UK’s goal of reaching net zero emissions by 2050. In particular, Professor Stuart Haszeldine of Edinburgh University suggested that the coal was unlikely to be of sufficiently high quality for use in the UK and EU steelmaking markets and the majority was likely to end up being exported further afield, thus negating any net emissions savings on transport, while Professor Paul Ekins of University College London stated that there was no doubt in his mind that the proposals were incompatible with the UK’s emissions targets.

A further blow to the contention that the mine could be rendered net-zero-compatible via carbon offsetting was dealt by the very organisation proposed to supply the carbon credits required to facilitate the offsetting, the Gold Standard Foundation. In a letter to Friends of the Earth and to the inquiry, the Foundation stated that:

“The latest scientific paper from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change on August 9 gave a stark reminder of the pace at which the planet is warming and the unequivocal influence of human activity on this warming, in particular the extraction and use of fossil fuels.

“We note that achievement of the goals of the Paris Agreement would be rendered impossible by the already planned increase in fossil fuels (UN Production Gap Report, 2019), and that the International Energy Agency has clearly stated that further investment in fossil fuels is unnecessary, with achieving global net zero goals instead requiring a rapid reduction in their use.

“It is clear to us, in light of this evidence and reflecting the principles of the mitigation hierarchy, that a new coal mine in 2021 is an activity that must be avoided in the context of the climate emergency.”

Beyond the decision to call the application in, there have also been further signs that the tide of political opinion within the Conservative party might have turned against the project, with Energy Secretary Kwasi Kwarteng stating that there were “very compelling reasons” not to open it and MP for Penrith and the Border, Dr Neil Hudson, dropping his support for the project ahead of COP 26 and urging the Government to invest in clean energy jobs in Cumbria instead. Inspector Stephen Normington indicated that his report should be expected in late December or early January, after which the ultimate decision will rest with the Secretary of State.

Whatever Michael Gove ultimately decides, however, a legal challenge seems fairly likely, at which point all the issues around how our courts deal with climate litigation may come into play once more. All this raises the question — at what point will it become so apparent that we are not on track to meet our net zero emissions targets that the courts will feel justified in declaring new fossil fuel developments to be unlawful? At what point will the effects of the climate crisis become so severe and so unarguable that any decision to approve such a development will be held to be irrational? How many more canaries will we allow to die before we finally decide to close the coal mine?

[1] For discussion of irrationality in this context see R. (on the application of Finch) v Surrey County Council [2020] EWHC 3566 (Admin) ,[2021] PTSR 1160, [127]; R (on the application of Friends of the Earth and others) v Heathrow Airport Ltd [2020] UKSC 52, [2021] PTSR 190, [125-129].

What I have been listening to this week…

A couple of weeks ago, some eighteen months after the gig was initially scheduled to take place, I was finally lucky enough to see Nick Cave in concert at the Royal Albert Hall. I have been a fan of his music since I was a child and so seeing him live was an absolute privilege and delight. Almost the entire setlist was from two albums: 2019’s majestic, if sometimes harrowing, ‘Ghosteen’ — a meditation on love and loss written in the aftermath of the death of Cave’s teenage son in 2015 — and 2020’s ‘Carnage’, a wild and surreal lockdown album composed over just three days alongside longtime collaborator Warren Ellis. Both are exceptional in their own way and I have been listening to them and the rest of the Bad Seeds back catalogue a lot since the gig.

On a slightly more sedate note, my choir is currently rehearsing for a performance of Brahms’ Requiem in December, so I have been reacquainting myself with one of my absolute favourite choral works, and trying not to get too out of breath singing the fugue in movement six!


The Kingsland Cup 2021… Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Moot

Last Thursday, after a year of virtual advocacy exercises, I took part in my first ever in-person moot. The Kingsland Cup and Prize Moot is run annually by Francis Taylor Building. Named in honour of Lord Kingsland QC, it covers a wide range of public, environmental and European law topics. Participants tackle two moot problems over the course of three rounds, with a paper sift of skeleton arguments followed by two ‘live’ rounds.

The 2021 final took place last week and my teammate, Tom Lambert, and I were fortunate enough to be declared the winners after a closely matched competition with an excellent team from the University of Oxford. It was judged by Sir Keith Lindblom, Senior President of Tribunals, and Professor Alison Young, Sir David Williams Professor of Public Law at the University of Cambridge. I am extremely grateful to both of them for giving up their time and to Esther Drabkin-Reiter and Michael Brendan Brett from FTB for organising this year’s competition and setting two fascinating and finely balanced moot problems.

The first round and semi-final involved a highly technical planning law problem, focusing on whether a Lawful Development Certificate (LDC) can be granted under s. 191 Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (“the 1990 Act”) to certify that a site has ‘nil’ planning use, and the circumstances in which a previous use may be said to have been abandoned. The claimant was a local authority, which had refused to grant an LDC to a multiplex cinema chain to certify that a recently acquired site had nil use. That refusal had been overturned on appeal by a planning inspector, who decided that s. 191 gave him the power to grant an LDC for nil use and that he was justified in granting one in the present circumstances, on the basis that the previous use of the site as an independent cinema had been abandoned. The multiplex chain appeared in the proceedings as an interested party but was not represented by counsel.

The claimant brought a judicial review on two grounds:

  1. The Decision by the Inspector was unlawful on the basis that there was no power to grant a Lawful Development Certificate under s. 191(1)(a) of the 1990 Act for a ‘nil’ use.

  1. The Inspector erred in law in concluding that the use had been abandoned.

For the first round, teams had to submit two skeleton arguments, one for the claimant and one for the defendant. Four teams were then selected to go forward to the semi-final, which took place on Zoom in April this year, with the claimant and defendant roles in each semi-final being assigned at random. Tom and I were representing the claimant local authority. Alongside a team from the Inns of Court College of Advocacy, we battled our way through some significant technical difficulties to present our submissions.

On Ground 1, which I took, the case ultimately turned on the somewhat esoteric semantic question of whether the phrase “any existing use of buildings or other land” in s. 191(1)(a) of the 1990 Act extended to cover nil use. Could “any” also encompass “none” or did it have to refer to a positive use? I was both gratified and slightly disappointed when Sir Keith Lindblom, who also judged our semi-final, beat me to the King Lear quote I had planned to include in my summing up (“nothing will come of nothing”) in one of his interventions. One of our central submissions was that, since planning enforcement action cannot be taken against a site that truly has nil use, the only possible reason the interested party could have had for wishing to obtain an LDC was to circumvent the ordinary planning process and the policies in the Local Plan designed to prevent the loss of grassroots leisure and entertainment venues.

Ultimately, although he reserved judgment, Sir Keith indicated that he was inclined to agree with the claimant’s position that the provisions of s.191 did not extend to nil use. This was primarily due to the plain meaning of the words in the statute but also because of the impossibility of enforcement action against a site that has truly been abandoned and has no planning use. 

We advanced to the final and out of my comfort zone. Having previously worked in housing policy, I was at least somewhat familiar with planning legislation and policy, even if the provisions around Lawful Development Certificates were new to me. The problem for the final, however, involved a range of legal issues with which I was less familiar, including the relationship between Article 8 and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the nature of proportionality review and whether or not consistency should be accepted as a freestanding ground of judicial review. Perhaps inspired by a certain viral parish council meeting earlier this year, it was an appeal to the Supreme Court concerning the decision by a District Council Monitoring Officer to sanction a parish councillor for breaking the parish council Code of Conduct with an unruly outburst in an online meeting.

Though clearly inspired in part by the Jackie Weaver saga, the facts of the case and the legal issues raised were actually most similar to those in R (on the application of Robinson) v Buckinghamshire Council [2021] EWHC 2014 (Admin), where the High Court quashed the decision of a Deputy Monitoring Officer to sanction Cllr Clive Robinson over comments he had made about fellow councillors, which were said to be in breach of the PC Code. The court in Robinson held that the sanction represented a disproportionate infringement on Mr Robinson’s right to freedom of Expression under Article 10 ECHR, and therefore a violation of s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.

The case in the Kingsland final centred on whether or not the decision to uphold a complaint against a councillor for saying “You do not have the authority to do this, Alice Tinker! You can’t just expel them from the meeting, face up to the accusations of incompetence, you big girl’s blouse!” was a similarly disproportionate interference with his Article 10 rights, and whether it mattered that a similar complaint against Ms Tinker had been decided differently. The grounds of appeal were:

  1. The judge at first instance erred in finding that the speech in question was not supported by case law on protection of political speech and/or that the decision to uphold the complaint was proportionate.
  1. The judge erred in finding that she could not consider consistency as a freestanding ground of review.

As the final was in person, each team was required to bring two hard copies of the bundle, one for ourselves and one for the judges. With nearly 500 pages of authorities between us, this meant that each team arrived with around 1000 neatly tabulated pages, which certainly helped add to the illusion that we were taking part in a real hearing. 

This time, Tom and I were acting for the respondent and again I took Ground 1. I submitted that the Monitoring Officer was correct to decide that the quoted portion of Cllr Trott’s outburst was not political speech and should not therefore be afforded enhanced protection under Article 10, drawing heavily on the judgment in Heesom v Public Service Ombudsman for Wales [2014] EWHC 1504 (Admin), [2014] 4 All E.R. 269, which distinguished between “matters of public administration and public concern including comments about the adequacy or inadequacy of performance of public duties by others” on the one hand and “gratuitous personal comments” on the other, and held that the former would be classed as political speech, while the latter would not [38(v)]. I characterised Cllr Trott calling Cllr Tinker a “big girl’s blouse” as a gratuitous personal comment.

I also submitted that the sanction was justified on the basis of the qualifications to the right to free expression in Article 10(2) ECHR, in light of the need to balance Cllr Trott’s Article 10 rights against Cllr Tinker’s right to a reputation under Article 8.  Finally, I submitted that proportionality is not a substitutionary review, and an appellate court should therefore uphold the decision of a lower court, provided it is satisfied that the lower court carried out the balancing exercise correctly, even if it might itself have come to a different conclusion on the facts. On this last point, I deployed a cricketing analogy, likening the process of proportionality review in an appellate court to a scenario in which hawk-eye indicates that a DRS review of an LBW decision remains “umpire’s call”.

Our opponents, Daniil Ukhorskiy and Amy Gregg, made some excellent arguments drawing on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, about the difficulty and undesirability of disaggregating comments made in the heat of the moment and separating them into categories of political and non-political speech. Tom was extremely patient with me as I dealt with numerous judicial interventions on the plausibility of such disaggregation and overran my allotted time, leaving him with only ten minutes or so to make his submissions on whether consistency should be accepted as a freestanding ground of judicial review.

On Ground 2 the key questions were whether or not the case law indicates that consistent administration can be viewed separately from the doctrines of irrationality and legitimate expectation, and whether it would be desirable for it to stand alone as a ground of review in its own right. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the Supreme Court’s judgment in R (on the application of Gallaher Group Ltd and ors) v The Competition and Markets Authority [2018] UKSC 25, [2019] A.C. 96 was only authority for the fact that equal treatment is not a distinct principle of administrative law. It did not address the issue of consistent administration — that is the obligation for public authorities to apply their policies in a consistent way. Tom submitted in response that such a fine distinction would create unnecessary confusion in the law and that there was, in any event, no need to draw it. Decisions which might fall foul of a doctrine of consistent administration would probably be overturned anyway on the basis of irrationality or the frustration of legitimate expectations.

The judges deliberated for around fifteen minutes and, while they again reserved their judgment, they suggested on Ground 1 that the appellant’s position on the disaggregation of intermingled comments would likely be accepted, though they agreed that the role of the court in a proportionality review was not to remake the decision. On Ground 2, Sir Keith questioned whether it really mattered if consistency was officially accepted as a freestanding ground of review or not, since the facts of the case clearly indicated that Cllr Trott was not treated fairly by the Monitoring Officer and the decision might therefore have been deemed to be unsound on that basis. However, he did conclude by suggesting that the law should not be like mushrooms (a running theme throughout counsel’s submissions) and multiply grounds of review excessively.

Had this been a real case, we likely would have lost, since the judges indicated that they probably would have allowed the appeal, at least on Ground 1. Fortunately for us, however, mooting is not real life and we were declared the winners by an extremely narrow margin. Competing in this year’s Kingsland Cup has been a wonderful experience. It has taught me a great deal, both about the relevant areas of law and about online and in-person advocacy. I would highly recommend the competition to anyone with an interest in public law.